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CAN A LIBERAL TAKE HIS OWN SIDE IN AN ARGUMENT? THE 
CASE FOR JOHN RAWLS’S IDEA OF POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
RONALD C. DEN OTTER* 
Critics of liberal theory have long insisted that liberal democracies cannot 
inspire the kind of patriotism that motivates citizens to make sacrifices for the 
polity.1  As Alasdair MacIntyre once put it, being asked to die for the modern 
liberal state “is like being asked to die for the telephone company.”2  This 
critique of liberal citizenship, which is closely aligned with the civic 
republican tradition, is based on the belief that good citizenship requires deeply 
shared values or a common definition of the human good life.3  One of the 
 
* Ph.D., 2003, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1992, University of Pennsylvania Law 
School; B.A., 1989, University of California, Davis. 
  The author would like to thank Andy Sabl, Brian Walker, Andrew Lister, Michael 
Goodhart, and Dana Yi for all of their help. 
 1. See, e.g., Michael J. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 12 
POL. THEORY 81 (1984); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN 
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 3–24 (1996); Charles Taylor, Liberal Politics and the Public 
Sphere, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 257, 276 (1995); Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Illusions of 
Cosmopolitanism, in MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS 
OF PATRIOTISM 77 (Joshua Cohen ed., 1996). See also LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Michael J. 
Sandel ed., 1984) (Generally, this critique tends to assume that patriotism must be based on so-
called “givens” of human life: ancestors, family, religion, history, culture, tradition, and 
nationality.).  As such, its political implications tend to be conservative.  From the other end of 
the spectrum, postmodernists take liberal values to task for being incapable of accommodating 
morally important differences.  See, e.g., Iris Marion Young, Survey Article: Rawls’s Political 
Liberalism, 3 J. POL. PHIL. 181, 181–90 (1995). 
 2. Alasdair MacIntyre, A Partial Response to my Critics, in AFTER MACINTYRE: CRITICAL 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE WORK OF ALASDAIR MACIINTYRE 283, 303 (John Horton & Susan 
Mendus eds., 1994). 
 3. For a discussion of the different types of communitarians, see John R. Wallach, Liberals, 
Communitarians, and the Tasks of Political Theory, 15 POL. THEORY 581, 591–92 (1987).  For a 
discussion of the different versions of communitarianism, see Allen E. Buchanan, Assessing the 
Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 99 ETHICS 852 (1989).  On the civic republican revival in 
legal scholarship, see Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); MARK TUSHNET, RED, 
WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988).  On the similarities 
and differences between communitarians and civic republicans, see Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “He 
Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out”: Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal 
Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581 (1993).  Although the most famous contemporary expositions 
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primary functions of a substantive moral consensus in these neorepublican 
accounts is to generate the right kind of moral motivation on the part of 
citizens, thereby enabling them to fulfill their civic responsibilities.4  The thin 
values of minimalist liberalism, these critics warn, cannot hold a society 
together over time.5  This “nonviability” objection lies at the heart of 
neorepublican critiques of liberalism.6 
One might expect liberals to try to parry these charges by arguing that 
widespread commitment to liberal values such as constitutionalism, limited 
government, due process of law, individual rights, freedom of conscience, and 
tolerance could sustain the common sentiments that would underwrite the 
practice of good citizenship in a liberal democracy.  This response would 
appear to allow liberals to claim that their own substantive values could be 
equally effective in cultivating the requisite patriotic sensibilities.7  The kind of 
civic virtue that a liberal society requires, then, even in the absence of a shared 
understanding of the good, would not need to be too far removed from a deeper 
moral consensus that could serve as the basis of social unity.  In addition, by 
relying on such substantive values, liberals could answer the allegation that 
their commitment to individual freedom or autonomy leads to an “anything 
goes” kind of moral relativism that encourages people to not believe in 
anything very deeply.8 
 
in political theory of civic republicanism are historiographical, the author is interested exclusively 
in its normative political implications for a modern liberal democracy such as our own.  For this 
reason, this Article focuses on Charles Taylor’s version of civic republicanism. 
 4. In this paper, I subsume communitarian and civic republican concerns about the quality 
of citizenship in liberal democracies under the term “neorepublican.”  There are important 
differences, of course, between various forms of communitarianism and various forms of civic 
republicanism.  What they have in common, though, is a belief that liberal societies do a very 
poor job of inculcating civic virtue in their citizens. 
 5. The term “minimalist liberalism” is found in SANDEL, supra note 1, at 18. 
 6. Charles Taylor coined the “nonviability” objection.  CHARLES TAYLOR, Cross-
Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 181, 194 (1995).  
John Rawls has been one of its favorite targets.  His critics contend that his theory of justice is too 
far removed from a shared social understanding of the good, rendering his well-ordered society 
inherently unstable. 
 7. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND 
DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 165–237 (1991). 
 8. This Article does not take a position on whether autonomy, negative freedom, tolerance, 
or value pluralism, or a combination of them, defines the moral core of liberalism.  Over time, 
there have been many different self-described liberals who have had many different value 
commitments.  For example, Isaiah Berlin believed that liberalism was compatible with value 
pluralism and thought that a strong commitment to negative liberty followed from its existence.  
Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 166 (Henry Hardy ed., 1969).  More recently, 
John Gray has contended that value pluralism and negative liberty do not fit together.  JOHN 
GRAY, ENLIGHTENMENT’S WAKE: POLITICS AND CULTURE AT THE CLOSE OF THE MODERN AGE  
(1995).  In response, William Galston has argued that value pluralism, as distinguished from 
value relativism, most accurately describes our moral universe and that “liberal democracy is the 
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A thicker conception of good liberal citizenship, however, would seem to 
run afoul of the moral pluralism that characterizes contemporary liberal 
democracies.9  After all, to be a liberal is to believe that competent adults can 
be left alone to form, revise, and pursue their own conceptions of the good.10  
In principle, this commitment to the separation of human flourishing from 
political morality means that liberal states should not take sides in public 
debates over competing reasonable conceptions of the good.11  That the moral 
motives that make the exercise of good citizenship possible would have to be 
predicated on deep and inevitably controversial beliefs about the proper place 
of civic virtue in a good human life would appear to be a decisive reason 
against trying to put a more civic republican conception of citizenship into 
practice.  Neorepublicans are right to insist that the state cannot be indifferent 
to how children are prepared for their future roles as citizens.12  However, the 
development of the right civic attitudes should not come at the excessive cost 
of denying the equal right of all citizens to formulate their life plans, including 
those who do not value political participation or patriotic self-sacrifice. 
This Article explains how political liberalism, as distinguished from 
comprehensive forms of liberalism,13 reduces the tension between the need for 
 
most nearly successful effort to cope decently with the vicissitudes of political life.”  William A. 
Galston, Value Pluralism and Liberal Political Theory, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 769, 769 (1999).  
These goods are plural because they “cannot be reduced to a common measure of value.” Id. at 
769–78.  Nor can these goods “be fully rank-ordered” in the sense that interpersonal comparisons 
are possible.  Id.  See also, WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PLURALISM: THE IMPLICATIONS OF 
VALUE PLURALISM FOR POLITICAL THEORY AND PRACTICE (2002).  On the problem of value 
incommensurability, see GERALD F. GAUS, CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF LIBERALISM 31–41 
(2003). 
 9. More than fifteen years ago, Don Herzog raised similar concerns about the extent to 
which more historical understandings of civic republicanism, such as those of J.G.A. Pocock and 
Quentin Skinner, could be a real option for us today as an alternative to liberalism.  Don Herzog, 
Some Questions for Republicans, 14 POL. THEORY 473 (1986). 
 10. Although the definition of a liberal can be contested, Will Kymlicka has argued that 
individual human rights approaches, such as freedom of speech, of association, and of conscience, 
do not adequately protect national and ethnic minority cultures.  Therefore, traditional liberal 
human rights principles must be supplemented by a theory of group-differentiated rights for such 
cultures to prevent forced assimilation.  WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A 
LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 3–6 (1995). 
 11. A conception of the good is “reasonable” when it does not harm others or does not 
unfairly infringe upon their equally important right to pursue their respective ways of life.  The 
concept of “neutrality” is relatively new to the liberal tradition.  JEREMY WALDRON, LIBERAL 
RIGHTS: COLLECTED PAPERS 1981-1991 (1993).  On the idea of liberal neutrality toward 
reasonable conceptions of the good, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL 
STATE 11 (1980); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PINCIPLE 127 (1985). 
 12. Cf. Charles Taylor, Why Democracy Needs Patriotism, in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: 
DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM, supra note 1, at 120. 
 13. As opposed to political liberalism, comprehensive or ethical liberalism is based on a 
conception of the good premised on autonomy, individuality, or negative freedom. 
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minimal civic virtue and the existence of reasonable moral pluralism in modern 
liberal democracies.14  This Article also challenges the neorepublican thesis 
that a common conception of the good based on patriotism must support the 
practice of good citizenship and offers an alternative, derived from John 
Rawls’s idea of public reason, that attempts to accommodate the moral, 
religious, and cultural beliefs of reasonable but nonliberal citizens.15  At the 
 
 14. But see Amy Gutmann, Civic Education and Social Diversity, 105 ETHICS 557 (1995); 
Eamonn Callan, Political Liberalism and Political Education, 58 REV. POLITICS 5 (1996). 
 15. For Rawls’s original theory of public reason, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
212–54 (1993) [hereinafter, RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM].  For his more recent views on 
public reason, see JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 89–94 (Erin Kelly ed., 
2001); John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in THE LAW OF PEOPLES 131 (1999).  
See generally Kent Greenawalt, On Public Reason, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669 (1994); Lawrence 
B. Solum, Constructing an Ideal of Public Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (1993); Bruce W. 
Brower, The Limits of Public Reason, 91 J. PHIL. 5 (1994).  As Samuel Freeman puts it, “[p]ublic 
reason is defined against a background of democratic institutions.  It presumes that citizens take 
democratic institutions seriously and are committed to maintaining them.”  Samuel Freeman, 
Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 371, 398 (2000).  For 
Rawls, public reason is supposed to map the kinds of reasons and arguments that publicly justify 
votes on fundamental political questions.  Voting is not a private act because it is an indirect 
exercise of coercive political power and thus ought to be actually justified or, at least in principle, 
be justifiable to all reasonable persons.  To produce legitimate collective decisions, citizens must 
refrain from voting according to reasons that are nonpublic, that is, those that are insufficiently 
impartial.  Above all, the ideal voter must avoid basing her vote on mere preferences.  Voting on 
such a basis might be morally acceptable if the outcome did not affect the lives of others.  
Whether one has a preference for chocolate over vanilla ice cream, for example, would seem to 
be a matter of personal taste that could be left solely to the individual.  On the other hand, some 
preferences, such as racial bigotry and misogyny, should not be counted at all in determining the 
legitimate grounds of public law.  When decisions affect others and have the force of law, mere 
preferences are not the proper basis for political choice because as the moral basis of law, they 
must also be supported by reasons that can be justified to others.  Similarly, one of the primary 
functions of judicial review is to modify or reject these preferences so that ordinary democratic 
politics does not produce morally objectionable results. 
  This is also the normative impetus behind theories of deliberative democracy that aspire 
to justify political decisions publicly to respect the freedom and equality of all of the members of 
the political community.  Voting appropriately, then, requires self-restraint on the part of citizens 
who must guard against relying upon reasons that are too partial to win the assent of others.  The 
kinds of reasons that citizens typically offer their fellow citizens are likely to be too partial in the 
sense of being either too self-interested or too sectarian.  Under conditions of moral pluralism, to 
legitimate collective decisions on fundamental political questions is to speak the same normative 
language, to find mutually acceptable reasons, and to converge on a range of similar solutions.  
People remain Catholics, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, and atheists in their private lives, but when 
they enter the public realm as citizens, they must be willing to treat others fairly.  Otherwise, their 
collective decisions will not be legitimate in the sense that dissenters have been given sufficient 
reasons to comply with them.  At minimum, political legitimacy means justified coercion.  In 
fact, the refusal of dissenters to acknowledge the authority of regulatory political principles would 
seem to be warranted when these principles are not supported by reasons that are widely 
acceptable under conditions of moral pluralism.  Their legitimacy might be successfully 
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very least, to be a good citizen in a liberal democracy is to have civic 
competence, that is, to have a set of deliberative, casuistic skills that enables a 
person to offer her fellow citizens mutually acceptable reasons in the process 
of legitimating collective decisions.16  This conception of citizenship calls for a 
civic attitude that acknowledges the inevitability of reasonable disagreement 
about the good in a free society and an ideal of civic virtue that is grounded in 
a moral commitment to respect the freedom and equality of everyone.17 
That does not mean, though, that all forms of religious, moral, and cultural 
pluralism should be accommodated or even tolerated.  The indiscriminate 
postmodernist embrace of difference overlooks practices that are deeply 
inegalitarian and, thus, are incompatible with the promotion of civic attitudes 
 
challenged on the grounds that their underlying justification is too controversial or too uncertain 
to secure either the actual or the hypothetical consent of all reasonable citizens. 
  Public reason is primarily about the legitimate grounds of coercion in a society such as 
our own.  Because those who do not obey public laws can be legitimately coerced, these laws 
must be justified from as many moral, religious, and cultural standpoints as possible.  The 
concern is that unreasonably forcing people to conform to other people’s judgments about how to 
live is deeply wrong and may even destabilize existing political arrangements.  What would 
constitute sufficient justification under conditions of moral pluralism, however, is far from 
obvious, especially in hard cases.  When the legitimacy of regulatory political principles is at 
issue, the problem with allowing citizens to introduce any argument whatsoever into public 
deliberation is that a morally diverse audience is unlikely to have much in common at deeper 
theoretical levels.  The purpose of public deliberation in the public sphere on constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice, for Rawls, is to render them legitimate from all reasonable 
comprehensive standpoints.  Such deliberation is not likely to serve its designated purpose when 
citizens appeal to their deeper convictions.  Their insistence that the truth of their deeper 
convictions can serve as the proper basis of the exercise of state coercion cannot lead to public 
justification under conditions of moral pluralism and, thus, cannot generate political legitimacy. 
  The fact that one sincerely believes that homosexuality is immoral, for instance, would 
not be a sufficiently compelling reason to justify the prohibition of same-sex marriages or to 
criminalize gay and lesbian relationships.  For Rawls, voting on the basis of such a nonpublic 
reason would not satisfy the criterion of reciprocity implicit in public reason.  A citizen who does 
not vote according to public reason displays a deeply wrong willingness to coerce her fellow 
citizens on the basis of nonpublic reasons.  In effect, such a vote denies dissenters their right to 
live in a way that is morally permissible even if it may not be morally right, virtuous, or rational.  
Rawlsian citizenship is predicated upon the belief that public reason demands nothing less than 
strict self-restraint on the part of the members of the political community when their votes (or 
those of their elected representatives) may coerce others.  When they vote appropriately, citizens 
establish reciprocal limits on external ends that they and their fellow citizens may permissibly 
seek.  These are the only means through which the freedom and equality of all reasonable citizens 
can be adequately respected.  To practice public reason is to tolerate religious, moral, and cultural 
difference as much as possible.  On the difficulty of tolerance, see T.M. Scanlon, The Difficulty of 
Tolerance, in TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE 226 (David Heyd ed., 1996). 
 16. See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987). 
 17. On the idea of reasonable moral disagreement and its connection to political liberalism, 
see Charles Larmore, Pluralism and Reasonable Disagreement, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, Winter 
1994, at 61. 
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that would help to create a more just, more democratic society in which each 
person has a roughly equal share of personal freedom and political influence.18  
Similarly, excessively strong versions of religious pluralism should not be 
celebrated when they prevent children from internalizing norms of public 
reason that are supposed to guide their civic behavior in the future.  Once we 
reject extremes that either take difference too seriously or not seriously 
enough, we must determine how a society of free and equal citizens can 
prepare its children for citizenship without seriously compromising reasonable 
moral pluralism.19  The central premise of this Article is that a trade-off 
between these two equally important considerations cannot be avoided and that 
there are better and worse ways of striking a balance between them.20 
As a number of critics have noted, Rawlsian citizenship, which requires a 
commitment to political autonomy, may be at odds with conceptions of the 
good that value other goods above autonomy or do not value autonomy at all.21  
It is unrealistic, they maintain, to believe that the practice of public reason will 
leave everything intact in the background culture.22  For this reason, as much 
as possible, civic education must be approached in a way that incorporates an 
idea of reasonableness that is largely independent of controversial ethical 
ideals of Lockean freedom, Kantian autonomy, and Millian individuality.23  
This Article contends that being reasonable, for political purposes, does not 
require a commitment to deep ethical (personal) autonomy and puts forth a 
model of civic education that relies on a much weaker conception of autonomy 
 
 18. See generally SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 
(Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999); BRIAN BARRY, CULTURE AND EQUALITY: AN EGALITARIAN 
CRITIQUE OF MULTICULTURALISM (2001). 
 19. EAMONN CALLAN, CREATING CITIZENS: POLITICAL EDUCATION AND LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY 12 (1997). 
 20. Put differently, without argument, this Article assumes that liberals often find themselves 
in the awkward position of (1) figuring out the limits of tolerance when religious, moral, or 
cultural practices threaten liberal values and (2) what tolerance on the part of citizens and 
neutrality on the part of the state might mean in particular cases, especially those in which 
nonliberal minority groups request exemptions from generally applicable laws or special 
treatment to preserve their traditional way of life.  Under conditions of this kind of pluralism, the 
right liberal response to any particular case ought to take into account both the rights of 
individuals in nonliberal groups to be left alone, at least to some degree, and the interest of the 
liberal state in ensuring that the values of individual freedom and tolerance will be reproduced 
over time.  That is, liberals must take their own side in an argument when the future of liberal 
citizenship is at stake.  The difficult political problem, then, is to know when the state should 
enact legislation against nonliberal practices that are likely to undermine the moral psychology of 
ordinary citizens that makes good liberal citizenship possible. 
 21. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 77–81. 
 22. Callan, supra note 14, at 12–17. 
 23. “Reasonableness” is the actual practice of public reason both in public deliberation and 
in voting decisions on fundamental political questions. 
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that is less likely to threaten nonliberal ways of life.24  This Article also 
challenges the mistaken belief that normative political theory has little to 
contribute to real political problems.25  Indeed, this Article will show why 
normative political theory is indispensable in helping us to determine where 
lines should be drawn in legal controversies that involve requests by minority 
groups for cultural or religious accommodation.26 
This Article will be divided into the following sections: Part I will outline 
Charles Taylor’s civic republican critique of procedural liberalism to explain 
why he believes that civic virtue must be predicated on a particular, widely 
shared conception of participatory self-rule.  Part II shows why comprehensive 
forms of liberalism do not adequately accommodate moral pluralism due to 
their preoccupation with advancing autonomy, individuality, or self-expression 
as a liberal conception of the good.  Part III spells out the merits of John 
Rawls’s idea of political liberalism under conditions of moral pluralism, why 
his notion of reasonableness can be sufficiently separated from deeper ideals of 
ethical autonomy to appeal to a wider audience, and why this kind of 
reasonableness is the right kind of civic attitude for those who must live 
together in a liberal democracy.  It then offers a brief account of liberal 
democratic civic education, derived from this sort of reasonableness, and 
makes the case that this kind of civic education should be morally acceptable 
to all reasonable people. 
 
 24. The idea of “political” autonomy is that citizens are to be autonomous only in their role 
as citizens.  On the idea of “political” liberalism, see Charles Larmore, Political Liberalism, 18 
POL. THEORY 339 (1990); Bruce Ackerman, Political Liberalisms, 91 J. PHIL. 364 (1994).  For an 
argument that the appeal of political liberalism derives from its commitment to tolerating “diverse 
ways of life and schemes of value,” see Samuel Scheffler, The Appeal of Political Liberalism, 
105 ETHICS 4 (1994).  For a fairly recent example of comprehensive liberalism, see generally 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).  On the contrast between political and 
comprehensive liberalism, see Gutmann, supra note 14, at 557–60; Stephen Macedo, Liberal 
Civic Education and Religious Fundamentalism: The Case of God v. John Rawls, 105 ETHICS 
468, 473–82 (1995). 
 25. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 
(1999). 
 26. Within the context of public education, for example, to what extent, if any, may parents 
have religiously objectionable material excluded from the curriculum?  Or may they have their 
children excused when such material is presented?  Shelley Burtt, Religious Parents, Secular 
Schools: A Liberal Defense of an Illiberal Education, 56 REV. POL. 51, 52 (1994).  For a liberal 
argument about the proper place of paternalism in the education of children, see Amy Gutmann, 
Children, Paternalism, and Education: A Liberal Argument, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 338 (1980). 
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I.  THE CIVIC REPUBLICAN CHALLENGE 
A. Charles Taylor’s Neorepublican Thesis 
Most neorepublicans have not been particularly forthcoming about their 
visions of the good society beyond vague, nostalgic appeals to community, 
tradition, and the social nature of human beings.27  Instead, they have devoted 
their time to singling out the apparent flaws of liberal theory and practice 
without offering a viable alternative of their own that would suit modern 
conditions.28  By contrast, Charles Taylor’s political theory endeavors to say 
something constructive about the proper place of civic virtue and civic 
participation in a liberal democracy.29 
His willingness to put forth more than a mere critique of contemporary 
liberal practice forces us to think more carefully about the kinds of reasons and 
sentiments that enable ordinary people to think of themselves as members of 
the same political community and to care about the public good.  Indeed, 
insofar as we have to choose between an ideal of citizenship that is more or 
less oriented toward civic virtue, the value of Taylor’s scholarly contribution is 
beyond dispute. 
In “Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate,”30 Taylor 
contends that many liberals overlook the importance of articulating a 
sociologically and psychologically realistic account of the social unity that 
makes the survival of liberal democracies possible.  For him, the language of 
civic republicanism and its ideal of participatory self-rule better address the 
possible sources of moral motivation that underwrite the practice of good 
citizenship, once enlightened self-interest and commitment to universal 
principle have been ruled out.31  Taylor points out that while taking an 
ontological position (a descriptive theoretical explanation of social life) is not 
the equivalent of advocating anything, ontology limits normative 
possibilities.32  Any political theory worthy of our consideration must make 
realistic assumptions about the kinds of beliefs and sentiments that motivate 
real people to act morally.  Liberals, he insists, must face this issue openly 
 
 27. See Stephen Holmes, The Permanent Structure of Antiliberal Thought, in LIBERALISM 
AND THE MORAL LIFE 227 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989). 
 28. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); 
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE 
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991). 
 29. RUTH ABBEY, CHARLES TAYLOR 107, 124, 158 (2000).  In particular, Abbey cites 
Taylor’s endorsement of positive freedom and his attempt to salvage it from the totalitarian 
connotation that Isaiah Berlin had imputed to it.  His attacks on atomism, negative liberty, liberal 
neutrality, and an instrumental view of politics also have a familiar communitarian tone. 
 30. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 181–203. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 183. 
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because if human existence is irreducibly social, then the real political choice 
is not as open-ended as they imagine it to be.  The table below depicts the 
relationship that Taylor envisions between ontology and advocacy (normative 




 Atomism Holism 
    
 
Individualistic Robert Nozick Wilhelm von Humboldt 




Collectivist B.F. Skinner Marx 
  
 
According to Taylor, these theoretical differences have important political 
ramifications because where one falls on this table determines the kind of 
political arrangements that the person favors.34  After ruling out atomistic 
(excessively individualistic) ontology and its corresponding advocacy positions 
as implausible, he claims that we must decide within the holistic ontological 
squares between a more procedural conception of liberal democracy based on a 
shared ethic of right (as in the United States) and a more participatory model 
based on self-rule (as in his native Canada).35 
His challenge to the viability of liberal “procedural” principles of justice 
boils down to his belief that such principles have an inadequate ontological 
grounding.36  Real people cannot strongly identify with the right because it is 
too procedural or too formal to tap their moral imaginations and to inspire 
patriotic self-sacrifice when necessary.  The civic republican thesis is still 
relevant because civic virtue is not a mere “convergent” good—i.e. a public 
good like national defense or clean air that only can be secured collectively—
but rather is a genuine “common” good.37  A common good, Taylor explains, 
involves dialogical intimacy that aspires to a holistic attitude of “for-us.”38  
The idea is that the value of such a good cannot be broken down into the sum 
 
 33. See id. at 185. 
 34. Id. at 182. 
 35. TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 200–01. 
 36. Id. at 187. 
 37. Id. at 190–91. 
 38. Id. at 190. 
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of its parts.  Rather, people must experience it together to appreciate its true 
meaning.  For example, people who attend a sporting event are likely to have a 
much different experience than those who watch the same event on television 
because of the interplay among the emotional reactions of those in 
attendance.39 
For Taylor, patriotism is a common good that makes participatory self-rule 
possible.40  To be patriotic in the right way is to identify with the fate of our 
fellow citizens.  As he puts it, we cannot be expected to “defend[] the liberty of 
just anyone.”41  Because procedural liberals fail to appreciate the implications 
of the tautology that our values are our values, their typical assumptions about 
what moves human beings to act morally in political life are deeply flawed.  A 
society that endorses the priority of the right pushes the common good of 
patriotism out the back door.42  Neither enlightened self-interest nor a shared 
understanding of the right can generate effective moral motivation on the part 
of most citizens.43  For this reason, a democratic society that lacks a 
widespread commitment to participatory self-rule is more at risk of bursting 
apart at the seams.44 
B. The Right and the Good 
It is easy to overstate the potential instability of Western liberal 
democracies, the dangers of depleted social capital, and the extent to which 
low voter turnouts are a serious sign of civic decline.45  Indeed, it is likely that 
Taylor is more concerned about the moral quality of politics in contemporary 
liberal democracies that aspire to be free in the sense that citizens rule 
themselves.  One of the problems with a shared conception of the good, based 
on participatory self-rule, is that it is not clear why Taylor believes that a 
shared conception of right necessarily rules out the sharing of justice or other 
principles of political morality as such a common good.  In other words, why 
do citizens have to endorse some version of civic republicanism when they 
could just as easily share the value commitments of procedural liberalism?  
Nor is it clear how his neorepublicanism can be squared with the moral 
pluralism that exists in modern liberal democracies.  After all, a conception of 
right, provided that it has historical antecedents in the particular political 
society that it is supposed to govern, may be able to hold that society together 
 
 39. See id. at 191. 
 40. Cf. ABBEY, supra note 29, at 40. 
 41. See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 187–88; SANDEL, supra note 28, at 64–65, 168–73. 
 42. See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 194. 
 43. Id. at 196–97. 
 44. Id. at 199. 
 45. See, e.g., ROBERT PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000). 
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over time by providing the same kind of patriotic identification that Taylor 
believes to be indispensable to the long-term health of any polity.46 
Unfortunately, the phrase “the priority of the right over the good” has 
generated considerable confusion.47  This phrase should not be interpreted as 
an ontological claim or as a kind of perfectionism.48  The priority of the right 
describes the role that principles of right or justice ought to play in regulating 
the collective decision making of human beings that inhabit the same social 
space.  As Kant wrote: 
One can think of the relation of end to duty in two ways: one can begin with 
the end and seek out the maxim of actions in conformity with duty or, on the 
other hand, one can begin with the maxim of actions in conformity with duty 
and seek out the end that is also a duty.  — The doctrine of right takes the first 
way.  What end anyone wants to set for his action is left to his free choice.  
The maxim of his action, however, is determined a priori, namely, that the 
freedom of the agent could coexist with the freedom of every other in 
accordance with a universal law.49 
The “doctrine of right” concerns the external relations among independent 
wills that may conflict with one another.50  In the public realm, principles of 
right must override contrary aspirations and desires of citizens even when 
those aspirations and desires are intense.51  As such, the priority of right 
restricts the kinds of considerations that can count as legitimate reasons for 
actions that affect others.52  It is “a court of appeal [that exists] above the 
ideological and sectarian fray” and aims to settle disputes fairly.53  A legitimate 
reason is one that fully respects the equal right of each person to form, revise, 
 
 46. For example, most Americans strongly identify with the rights of free speech, free 
exercise of religion, and due process that are specified in the United States Constitution.  To be an 
American is to see these constitutional values as our values and to assign them considerable 
weight in our collective decisions even though we might disagree about how they ought to be 
specified or balanced against each other in particular cases.  At the same time, the American 
political tradition is an eclectic mix of a number of different, and at times conflicting, political 
ideals.  See ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. 
HISTORY (1997). 
 47. See generally Richard J. Arneson, The Priority of the Right Over the Good Rides Again, 
108 ETHICS 169 (1997). 
 48. For examples of the misinterpretation, see Michael J. Sandel, Justice and the Good, in 
LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 159 (Michael J. Sandel, ed., 1984); Roberto Alejandro, Rawls’s 
Communitarianism, 23 CANADIAN J. PHIL. 75, 78–79 (1993). 
 49. IMMANUEL KANT, The Doctrine of Virtue, in THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 147 (Mary 
Gregor trans., 1996). 
 50. See id. at 23–24. 
 51. Samuel Freeman, Utilitarianism, Deontology, and the Priority of Right, 23 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 313, 336–37 (1994). 
 52. Id. at 337–38. 
 53. Macedo, supra note 24, at 481. 
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and pursue her own life plans.54  The claims that citizens put forth to pursue 
ends transgressing these limits, as Rawls puts it, have no weight.55  Within the 
constraints of right, then, citizens are left free to form, revise, and pursue their 
own ends.  The priority of the right also acknowledges the epistemic difficulty 
of qualitatively or quantitatively comparing the worth of different human life 
plans and rejects the political necessity of making these kinds of distinctions.56  
Politically, what matters is not the content of a given life plan per se but 
whether its pursuit is unreasonable in the sense that it harms others or 
impermissibly interferes with their life plans.57 
By contrast, the “doctrine of virtue” concerns the ends that ought to be 
adopted—those that cannot be subject to legislation in civil society because 
they are internal to the agent.58  On this deeply Kantian view, virtue is the 
ability to resist the pull of one’s inclinations and to act on reasons based on 
universal duties to other rational agents.59  We express our true nature—what is 
best about us as human beings—in rising above particular attachments and 
transitory concerns.60  To confuse the doctrine of right with the doctrine of 
virtue is to mistakenly conclude that the right is just another conception of the 
good.  The point is that principles of right are regulatory.  They are not pursued 
like other ends but rather are designed to constrain the choices and actions of 
citizens in the public sphere to ensure that everyone is treated with equal 
concern and respect.61 
C. Liberal Community 
Following Hegel, Taylor thinks of the right as a conception of the good 
that is too formal and too procedural to sustain the social bonds that hold a 
 
 54. Freeman, supra note 51, at 338. 
 55. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 209. 
 56. JOHN RAWLS, The Right and the Good Contrasted, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 37, 
49–51 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984). 
 57. Id. at 49. 
 58. Kevin E. Dodson, Autonomy and Authority in Kant’s Rechtslehre, 25 POL. THEORY 93, 
98 (1997). 
 59. See KANT, supra note 49, at 145. 
 60. See THOMAS E. HILL JR., THE IMPORTANCE OF AUTONOMY AND SELF-RESPECT 46 
(1991).  When Rawls states in POLITICAL LIBERALISM that a Kantian comprehensive doctrine 
cannot serve as the basis of political morality, he is referring to Kant’s idea of virtue, that is, the 
ability to resist our inclinations and to act on maxims that pass the Categorical Imperative test.  
See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 99–101. 
 61. As Amartya Sen points out, the vast majority of modern theories of social or political 
morality make equality of consideration a requirement because these normative theories have to 
be justified to others.  AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 17 (1992). 
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political society together over time.62  It follows, then, that liberalism 
predicated on the priority of the right is incompatible with a stronger sense of 
community.63  The first part of this charge is true only inasmuch as liberalism 
is hostile to communities that do not respect the freedom and equality of all of 
their members.  Even the most tolerant liberal cannot tolerate all ways of life, 
especially those that are intolerant and prone to violence.  There is no reason to 
grant communitarians or neorepublicans the privilege of defining 
“community,” as if by definition liberalism were too individualistic to leave 
room for a vibrant civil society, voluntary associations, and family life.  It 
should go without saying that liberals very much value the freedom of 
association that takes place in the background culture.  The real issue is not 
whether community matters, but how it matters and, more importantly, how 
community ought to be defined in the first place.  To appeal to traditional 
understandings of community is to beg the question.64 
We must ascertain on normative grounds, then, the kind of community that 
is most appropriate for a society like our own that must make room for the 
well-being of individuals and their voluntary associations.  This means that we 
must strike an appropriate balance between the legitimate rights of the 
individual citizen, including dissenters, and those of others who live in the 
same political community.  This also means that we must try to find reasons 
that go beyond uncritical appeals to tradition or to nostalgic notions of 
solidarity that gloss over the well-known pathologies of communities.  After 
all, individuals, as opposed to communities, are the objects of moral concern.  
A thoughtful response to this question about the character of a community that 
treats the life plans of all citizens as equally as possible requires a theory of 
justice that can arguably mediate, if not resolve, inevitable political 
disagreements about how moderately scarce resources, rights, duties, and the 
benefits and burdens of social cooperation should be allocated.65  A 
neorepublican theory of justice must not theorize away the existence of moral 
pluralism or circumstances of justice.66  Appeals to “community” and “virtue” 
 
 62. See generally TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 181–203.  See also JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON 
THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 349–71 (Barbara Herman ed., 2000) (discussing Hegel’s 
idea of the relationship between ethical life and liberalism). 
 63. See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 181–203.  But see Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 
77 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1989). 
 64. Taylor does not beg the question but rather puts forth a conception of community that is 
based on his more communitarian or neorepublican idea of liberalism and relies upon a strong 
conception of civic virtue.  See TAYLOR, supra note 6, at 181–203. 
 65. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 126–27 (1971). 
 66. For Rawls, “circumstances of justice” include (1) limited benevolence or altruism on the 
part of real human beings, (2) moderately scarce material resources, and (3) disagreement about 
the good.  Id. 
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ring hollow when they deny the very existence of moral disagreement and 
political conflicts that typically arise from it in liberal democracies. 
D. Neorepublican Skepticism 
Taylor’s neorepublican critique of so-called procedural liberalism relies 
too much on the Hegelian claim that apparently abstract, universal principles 
divorced from the good cannot be the basis of political morality.  Although this 
skeptical worry about the “pure” part of pure practical reason is hardly new, it 
still strikes a chord because no political theory can afford to make implausible 
assumptions about the sorts of reasons and sentiments that can motivate real 
people to act appropriately in their role as citizens.  This skepticism about the 
capacity of the right to replace the good as the basis of social unity is premised 
on the belief that liberal principles derived from the right cannot engage the 
will of ordinary human beings.  In turn, this belief rests on two claims: (1) that 
the moral vocabulary of the right does not capture real people’s moral self-
understandings and that (2) commitment to the right is rarely exhibited in real 
moral behavior and, therefore, lacks an empirical foundation.  While people 
may profess a commitment to fairness, tolerance, or other universal principles, 
what they really care about is their personal relationships.  Real people are 
loyal to those whom they know and trust because they feel emotionally close to 
them.  When asked for a reason for helping someone, they are likely to answer 
that this person is “my” friend, “my” boss, “my” classmate, or “my” neighbor.  
The abstract liberal principles that emerge from the right cannot capture the 
importance of the partial reasons that real people usually act from.  Liberal 
principles are the motivational equivalents of scarce human motives such as 
altruism and love because in cases of conflict they will always be trumped by 
more personal commitments.  As a result, neorepublicans are deeply 
pessimistic about the prospects of survival for liberal societies that overlook 
the personal ties that motivate moral behavior on the part of real human beings. 
For these reasons, they believe, thin liberal principles are bound to be 
motivationally deficient.  Only the concrete, particular values that emerge from 
a widely accepted understanding of the good can supply the content necessary 
to compel real people to act morally in political life.  Because good citizenship 
turns on effective moral motivation, citizens in liberal societies will never 
exhibit the kind of civic virtues that are found in more morally homogeneous 
communitarian societies.  At best, a liberal society is held together by fragile 
civic commitments that are based on narrow self-interest or on vague moral 
abstractions.  This claim about poor citizenship in liberal societies depends 
upon a belief that citizenship cannot be thought of as a part-time commitment 
that only applies when one enters public life.  Most people will not take their 
civic responsibilities seriously because they will not see anything wrong with 
not actively participating in public life or not making sacrifices for the 
common good.  Or, more simply, they will not care enough to do so.  They will 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2005] CAN A LIBERAL TAKE HIS OWN SIDE IN ARGUMENT? 333 
not view their community as their community but rather will view it, in 
Taylor’s terms, as a convergent good that need not be enjoyed together.  
Human beings are not the sorts of creatures who can do without thick civic 
bonds that emerge from a common definition of the good based on patriotism.  
Because real people are only moved to act based on this kind of identification, 
the range of moral motives cannot be expanded in the way in which procedural 
liberals hope it can be. 
Liberals fail to recognize the need for principles that are more in tune with 
the ways in which real people characterize their moral experiences.  Instead, 
they are preoccupied with positing universal principles that should be aspired 
to without critically assessing their assumption that human moral psychology 
is sufficiently malleable to make their ideals of civic behavior realistic 
possibilities.  Their fascination with what can be blinds them to the fact that 
real people need to share deep beliefs about collective ends to allow them to 
have a sense of community.  Liberals mistakenly believe that ordinary people 
need to share very little of substance before they can identify with their fellow 
citizens, and they fail to see that moral pluralism is likely to undermine the 
only possible common bond that a human society could have.  A perfectly 
neorepublican society would have to be more or less morally homogeneous 
because its citizens would openly acknowledge the need to share something 
less superficial than a mere commitment to fairness, tolerance, the rule of law, 
or individual rights.67  In addition, the public-private distinction, which has 
been so central to liberal thought over time, would have to be much less 
sharply pronounced.  In this way, neorepublicans hope to show that real 
people’s moral convictions cannot differ markedly without turning their 
society into a mere association of self-interested individuals or self-interested 
groups.  Alternatively, a common conception of the good based on civic virtue 
acknowledges the deep psychological need for the members of a human 
community to share an identity based on seeing their republic as a common 
enterprise. 
E. Rebuttal 
In human history, there has been no shortage of those who have appealed 
to the distinctness of their cultures, religions, traditions, and nationalities for a 
number of different political purposes, many of which have turned out to be 
morally unacceptable, if not evil.  That should give us reason to pause.  By 
contrast, it is hard to imagine a genocide or unjust war caused by appeals to 
human dignity.  Another difficulty is that Taylor makes no effort to explain 
how a shared social understanding of the good of participatory self-rule is 
compatible with the equal right of each citizen to form, revise, and pursue her 
 
 67. Cf. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 42 (1989) (arguing that 
the implications of most communitarian arguments are reactionary and inegalitarian). 
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own reasonable conception of the good.  After all, it is not so clear how civic 
republicanism and liberalism can be brought together when many liberals insist 
that citizens should be left free not to participate in politics if they choose not 
to do so.  It is far from obvious, furthermore, that liberal principles are 
motivationally inadequate simply due to their distance from the good.  In fact, 
the opposite would seem to be true: under conditions of moral pluralism, moral 
reasons that are appropriate for political life must be removed, as far as 
possible, from the sectarian struggles that have divided citizens over time.  
Taylor relies too heavily on a sharp distinction between procedure and 
substance that has little basis in theory or in practice. 
He also fails to explain why moral consensus must occur at a deeper level 
and why political reasons must reflect a conviction about the human good to be 
motivationally effective.  Similarly, it is not clear why he doubts that citizens 
can internalize so-called abstract liberal values, making them their own, when 
such values, like civic republican values, have their roots in our particular 
political heritage.  As we know, many people have died for such “abstract” 
ideals as freedom, democracy, and country.  American history alone is replete 
with examples.  The vast majority of Americans believe that the Constitution 
protects political dissent; the right to be free from racial, ethnic, gender, and 
religious discrimination; the right to be protected from physical abuse by the 
police; and the right to have access to courts.68 
It is not self-evident, then, why a historically grounded widespread 
commitment to the liberal values of our political heritage cannot provide the 
moral motives that political liberals such as Rawls are looking for despite their 
distance from the content of individual life plans.  The essential neorepublican 
insight that moral and political principles must address a particular audience to 
motivate appropriate civic behavior is true.  But for his critique of moral 
motivation in liberal societies to be decisive, Taylor would have to be able to 
show that a shared social understanding of the good is the only possible source 
of effective moral motivation.  The relevant comparison is not between a 
liberal account of the sources of moral motivation in a pluralistic society and 
the neorepublican account of these sources in an ideal, morally homogeneous 
society.  The relevant comparison must be made against the pluralistic society 
that we actually have.  Neorepublican accounts such as Taylor’s leave us to 
wonder how the diversity of religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines 
could be reduced, in the name of greater social unity, short of draconian 
measures. 
This asymmetry between liberal and neorepublican arrangements reveals a 
serious flaw in Taylor’s thinking about the most appropriate moral basis for 
political life.  While neorepublicans assume that what is good for an individual 
 
 68. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT x–xi (1999). 
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is good for the community as a whole, the kind of vision that inspires an 
individual in her personal projects significantly differs from that of principles 
of right that regulate the political relations of a morally pluralistic community.  
The question of the nature of the good life is not the equivalent of asking what 
regulatory principles offer the best means of resolving political conflicts as 
fairly as possible.  This line of response directly undercuts Taylor’s assumption 
that the sort of quasi-religious, moral orientation that is supposed to guide an 
individual’s life choices can be easily translated into a political morality that 
could settle moral disagreements in the public realm.  The kinds of reasons that 
underlie personal choices about what ends to pursue differ in kind from the 
sorts of reasons that can be used to justify the exercise of political power in the 
name of social justice or political legitimacy.  At minimum, neorepublicans 
need to argue for the appropriateness of this parallel rather than assuming that 
the two classes of reasons are comparable. 
II.  THE TROUBLE WITH COMPREHENSIVE LIBERALISMS 
A. Liberalism and Personal Autonomy 
As we might have expected, many liberals responded to the neorepublican 
critique by showing that liberalism has an adequate account of the kinds of 
goods—community, patriotism, civic friendship, solidarity—that their critics 
alleged were conspicuously absent among the traditional concerns of liberal 
thinkers.69  A liberal conception of the good based on autonomy or 
individuality, furthermore, is normatively superior to neorepublican 
alternatives.  As Brian Barry remarked, 
  Liberalism rests on a vision of life: a Faustian vision.  It exalts self-
expression, self-mastery . . . the active pursuit of knowledge and the clash of 
ideas; the acceptance of personal responsibility for the decisions that shape 
one’s life.  For those who cannot take the freedom it provides alcohol, 
tranquilizers, wrestling on the television, astrology, psychoanalysis, and so on, 
endlessly, but it cannot by its nature provide certain kinds of psychological 
security.70 
 
 69. Brian Barry, Joseph Raz, Amy Gutmann, and Will Kymlicka best exemplify the kind of 
liberalism that is explicitly perfectionist.  In spite of his ostensible multicultural sensibility, Will 
Kymlicka puts forth two distinctly liberal preconditions for living a good life: (1) autonomy and 
(2) freedom to reflect on and question one’s beliefs.  WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, 
COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 12–13 (1989).  He writes that “amongst the people who are leading 
their lives from the inside are people who have been brainwashed into accepting certain ends as 
their own, and who are discouraged from trying any other ways of life, through the systematic 
control of socialization, of the press, and of artistic expression.  And this is unacceptable to the 
liberal.”  Id. at 18–19. 
 70. BRIAN BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE 127 (1973). 
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On its face, showing that liberal principles are not empty would seem to take a 
lot of the sting out of neorepublican charges that liberal principles cannot 
engage the moral psychology of real human agents.71  This response would 
appear to allow liberals to take their own side in an argument while remaining 
as neutral as possible toward competing conceptions of the good life.72  After 
all, people who do not share deeper normative beliefs about the good are still 
left free to pursue nonliberal life plans within a liberal framework as long as 
these plans are the products of choice or critical reflection.73  Under a liberal 
scheme, people are given considerable latitude to determine what makes their 
lives meaningful even if they make these determinations in accordance with 
their religious beliefs or cultural traditions.  It would seem, then, that the 
apparent incommensurability between the deeper normative commitments of 
liberalism to a particular vision of the good and nonliberal ways of life is less 
serious than it initially appeared to be.  The people who pose the most serious 
threat to the stability of a liberal state can become good citizens provided that 
they can be persuaded that a liberal conception of human flourishing leaves 
sufficient room for their own moral, religious, or cultural self-
understandings.74 
Compared with civic republican alternatives, there is something to be said 
in defense of a more comprehensive liberalism and its capacity to 
accommodate a wider range of conceptions of the good.75  The problem with 
 
 71. By adopting this strategy, however, liberals have allowed the communitarians to narrow 
the discourse, focusing it on the nature of the human good and on the type of moral vocabulary 
that most accurately captures real people’s moral self-understandings.  This turn of events played 
into the communitarians’ hands by permitting them to avoid the question of how they would 
approach the problem of developing suitable political principles for a morally pluralistic society.  
To date, the communitarians have been reticent about how they would use the power of the state 
to create a more morally homogeneous society or to promote a more active, participatory ideal of 
citizenship. 
 72. On the idea of liberal neutrality, see generally Will Kymlicka, Liberal Individualism and 
Liberal Neutrality, 99 ETHICS 883 (1989). 
 73. The natural instinct to keep autonomy (or some conception of negative freedom) at the 
center of liberalism, but also to be tolerant of nonliberal ways of life drives Will Kymlicka’s 
liberal theory of minority rights.  KYMLICKA, supra note 10, at 6. 
 74. But see Will Kymlicka, Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance, in TOLERATION: AN 
ELUSIVE VIRTUE, supra note 15, at 81, 93. 
 75. Although from 1963 to 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court granted a number of exceptions to 
accommodate the practices of religious minorities, those who hold unorthodox religious beliefs 
always stand on precarious ground.  For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 
(1963), the Court ruled that any federal or state law that substantially burdened religious 
practices, regardless of the state’s intention or the scope of the law, would be presumptively 
unconstitutional.  This presumption could be overcome if the state could prove that: (1) the 
government had a particularly important interest and (2) that granting such an exception would 
substantially hinder the fulfillment of that interest.  See id.  In Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990), however, the Court dramatically cut back the “grant an exception when feasible” 
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this kind of approach to the problem of moral pluralism, though, is that it still 
favors the kinds of lives that are autonomously chosen over ones that cannot be 
justified in terms of the overriding value of choice, introspection, and 
contemplation in human life.  In other words, it still is too likely to be too 
sectarian to secure the moral support of all reasonable persons.76  This may 
mean that the political effects of a public culture based on a liberal conception 
of the good would not be sufficiently neutral because those who have 
nonliberal life plans are only accorded civic respect insofar as their respective 
life plans do not conflict with the liberal commitment to autonomy, 
individuality, and self-expression.  This solution seems to be dismissive of the 
way in which those who have nonliberal convictions understand the value of 
their own lives.  The reasons that various members of religious minorities in 
the United States often put forth as an explanation for why they want to limit 
their children’s exposure to secular values in public school, for example, often 
have to do with the fact that they do not value autonomy, critical reflection, 
and individuality at all.77 
Their values, of course, may be wrong, but that is largely beside the point.  
For the sake of political legitimacy under conditions of moral pluralism, 
liberals should not use the state to advance autonomy as a conception of the 
good.78  The reason for preferring some sort of political liberalism as the basis 
 
approach by requiring not only a disparate impact on religious minorities but also a finding of 
intentional discrimination.  Today, the Court’s decision in the infamous peyote case has greatly 
reduced the likelihood that a litigant who challenges a federal or state law on free exercise 
grounds will prevail short of a showing of intentional discrimination.  The rights of free speech, 
free exercise of religion, and free assembly, furthermore, have not always protected minority 
groups from the will of the majority.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165–66 
(1878) (upholding the constitutionality of a federal law that prohibited polygamy in federal 
territories); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605–06 (1961) (upholding the application of a 
state Sunday closing law to orthodox Jewish merchants); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 
U.S. 574, 603–04 (1983) (upholding the IRS’s denial of tax-exempt status to the university 
because of its whites-only admission policy); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Ass’n., 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) (holding that the federal government could construct a road 
through federal land even though the construction would destroy certain Native Americans’ 
traditional rituals).  Granting exemptions in cases of religion, moreover, may run afoul of the 
Establishment Clause.  A classic example of this problem is when the state decides to grant a tax 
exemption to a religious organization to further the free exercise rights of its members, this direct 
subsidy to religion may be seen as violating the constitutionally required separation of church and 
state. 
 76. This Article leaves open the empirical questions of the degree to which Christian 
Fundamentalists, given their sincere religious convictions, are potentially reasonable.  Even 
among such persons, we should expect to find a range of different personalities and 
corresponding civic attitudes.  But see generally BRUCE B. LAWRENCE, DEFENDERS OF GOD: THE 
FUNDAMENTALIST REVOLT AGAINST THE MODERN AGE (1989). 
 77. See, e.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 78. Perfectionist liberals come in many shapes and forms.  For example, William Galston 
argues for the value of a “full theory of the good latent in liberal practice.”  William Galston, 
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of political morality is not only that comprehensive liberalisms, which rely 
upon controversial liberal conceptions of the good, are more likely to 
precipitate political conflict among reasonable citizens.  Respect for reasonable 
moral pluralism also requires a political morality that does not employ a strong 
conception of autonomy so that all reasonable citizens can endorse the same 
political morality for minimally moral reasons.79  For public reason to regulate 
public deliberation and voting decisions on fundamental political questions, the 
vast majority of citizens must be motivated to apply its norms without having 
to sacrifice their deeper moral or religious convictions.  This may mean that 
liberals may have to tolerate ways of life that they find to be deeply misguided.  
Today, religious, moral, and cultural differences about how human beings 
ought to live extend far beyond the relatively narrow sectarian differences that 
existed in Locke’s or even in Mill’s time.  A version of liberalism that takes 
the breadth and depth of this kind of moral pluralism seriously is the most 
promising candidate as a theory of political morality because it has the best 
chance of being accepted by a diverse audience for the right reasons and thus 
legitimating collective decisions. 
The allegiance of those who have reasonable but nonliberal conceptions of 
the good cannot be taken for granted.80  We ought to assume that a fair number 
of citizens in liberal societies may not readily accept the role that public reason 
is supposed to play in political life unless they have good reasons to believe 
that its norms will not unduly compromise their ways of life.  After all, it is 
highly unlikely that even political liberalism would have non-neutral effects.81  
As William Galston notes, “a liberal society cannot be equally hospitable to all 
conceptions of the good . . . .”82  As such, we should not be overly optimistic 
about the ease of justifying norms of public reason, which appear to be closely 
linked to liberal ideas of human flourishing, to those who adhere to nonliberal 
doctrines. 
On the other hand, we should not assume that different beliefs about the 
good will make it impossible for citizens to be motivated to honor public 
 
Defending Liberalism, 76 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 621, 627 (1982).  Stephen Macedo believes that 
“[l]iberal justice and rights . . . partly determine the ends, goals, and visions of the good life that 
liberal citizens pursue.”  STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND 
COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 5 (1990). 
 79. Cf. GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 9 (1988) (arguing 
that autonomy need not be an all-or-nothing affair). 
 80. As Stuart Hampshire writes: 
It is not only possible but, on present evidence, probable that most conceptions of the 
good, and most ways of life, which are typical of commercial, liberal, industrialized 
societies will often seem altogether hateful to substantial minorities within these societies, 
and even more hateful to most of the populations within traditional societies elsewhere. 
STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 24–25 (2000). 
 81. See, e.g., Macedo, supra note 24, at 483. 
 82. William A. Galston, Pluralism and Social Unity, 99 ETHICS 711, 718 (1989). 
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reason as the fairest means of making collective decisions that would bind 
everyone.  Those who are skeptical move too quickly from the brute fact of 
disagreement about the good life in liberal societies to the conclusion that it 
will be equally difficult, if not impossible, to find common principles of 
regulatory political morality.83  This inference is not warranted because we 
have not yet carefully surveyed the range of arguments that might be employed 
to justify such a morality to those who are not already liberal.  Nor does 
political liberalism necessarily exclude religious people from the public 
sphere.84  Such liberalism is the right solution to this problem of political 
legitimacy under conditions of moral pluralism because it avoids the two errors 
that liberals are most inclined to commit: to base their political morality on a 
controversial, overly sectarian liberal conception of the good that only appeals 
to citizens who are already converted, or to tolerate too much moral difference 
in a misguided effort to be completely neutral toward competing conceptions 
of the good life.85  Any plausible theory of political legitimacy must navigate 
between these two extremes to encourage the vast majority of citizens to 
support liberal institutions for the right reasons.86 
B. The Advantages of Political Liberalism 
Strangely, despite the obvious appeal of a theory of legitimacy that aims at 
securing as wide a consensus as possible on the basis of minimally moral 
reasons, many liberal thinkers have not been eager to embrace political 
liberalism in any shape or form.87  Part of the explanation for their reluctance 
originates in the legitimate worry that the normative content of liberal theories 
of justice will be severely compromised if these theories have to be tailored to 
the moral beliefs of nearly everyone.  Political liberalism, they fear, would 
tolerate too much injustice.88  Others are convinced that the alleged difference 
between comprehensive and political liberalism is a distinction without a 
difference.  As Stephen Macedo observes, “[i]t is tempting to say that the only 
 
 83. See, e.g., JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 159–61 (1999); Jeremy 
Waldron, Deliberation, Disagreement, and Voting, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 210 (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds., 1999). 
 84. But see generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN 
LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993). 
 85. Without argument, this Article assumes that (1) there is no such thing as “perfect” 
fairness or “perfect” neutrality, (2) some balances are fairer than others are and therefore, would 
be approved of by most reasonable people, (3) the effects of important political decisions are 
bound to be non-neutral and impose disparate burdens on some people and groups, and (4) that 
romanticizing diversity is not only too easy, theoretically, but also that it can be politically 
irresponsible in the sense that it can lead to undemocratic and unjust outcomes. 
 86. See Macedo, supra note 24, at 476. 
 87. See, e.g., Brian Barry, John Rawls and the Search for Stability, 105 ETHICS 874 (1995). 
 88. See, e.g., Joshua Cohen, Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus, in THE IDEA OF 
DEMOCRACY 270 (David Copp et al. eds., 1993). 
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real difference between political and comprehensive liberalisms is that 
proponents of the latter are simply more candid in admitting that liberal 
institutions foster an ideal of life as a whole and that ‘civil’ toleration 
inevitably promotes ‘religious’ toleration.”89 
At the same time, if liberals refuse to broaden the basis of support for their 
political morality, they remain vulnerable to the charge that their reasons are 
too sectarian to win the assent of all reasonable persons.90  This is not only a 
concern about securing actual consent.  In addition, it is far from obvious that 
reasonable, informed citizens ought to endorse political arrangements that 
would unfairly threaten their nonliberal ways of life.  One of the main purposes 
of a theory of political liberalism is to show how people, who disagree about 
their highest ideals of human flourishing, still might be able to agree on the 
same answers to fundamental political questions for similar reasons, thereby 
legitimating what otherwise would be unjustified coercion.  As contrasted with 
his original theory of justice, Rawls’s political conception of justice reflects a 
sustained effort to reach those who are reasonable but who have nonliberal life 
plans.  What moved Rawls to write the essays that followed A Theory of 
Justice was his realization that many of these citizens might be reasonable in 
the sense that they would be willing to offer their fellow citizens fair terms of 
social cooperation.  In this respect, his initial account of political legitimacy 
was defective insofar as reasonable citizens who adhere to nonliberal 
comprehensive doctrines could not support the same principles of justice for 
the right reasons. 
It would be natural, then, to expect commentators to address his new 
characterization of the most appropriate sources of moral motivation in 
Political Liberalism and its connection to his concern with stability.91  For the 
most part, though, this has not happened despite the fact that Rawls explicitly 
links stability to “sufficient motivation of the appropriate kind.”92  This 
oversight is even more surprising in light of Rawls’s well-known 
dissatisfaction with his original account of the stability of his well-ordered 
 
 89. Macedo, supra note 24, at 476.  See also Harry Brighouse, Is There Any Such Thing as 
Political Liberalism?, 75 PAC. PHIL. Q. 318 (1994). 
 90. In other words, under conditions of moral pluralism, to legitimate regulatory principles 
of justice and the particular decisions that fall under them, liberals must put aside their sincere 
convictions about truth and human perfection.  The point is not to renounce what they believe to 
be true, but to recognize the virtual impossibility of publicly justifying any single account of the 
whole truth because of the inherent limits of reason.  On the idea of “reasonable” pluralism, see 
Cohen, supra note 88. 
 91. Samuel Freeman notes that “very little of significance has been written on Rawls’s 
argument for stability in Part III of A Theory of Justice, and virtually nothing has been written on 
the central feature of that argument on ‘the congruence of the right and the good.’”  Samuel 
Freeman, Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just Democratic Constitution, 69 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 619, 623 (1994). 
 92. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 142–43. 
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society in the third part of A Theory of Justice.93  One of the central aims of 
“Political Liberalism is to restate the idea of justice as fairness without reliance 
on a controversial comprehensive doctrine” as the exclusive source of the 
moral reasons that underwrite the practice of good citizenship.94 
Initially, Rawls had thought that citizens could support justice as fairness 
for deeper liberal reasons, narrowing the motivational distance between a 
citizen’s conception of the good and her support for the two principles of 
justice.95  Reasons for being just could be incorporated into each citizen’s 
conception of the good, Rawls thought, to generate the moral motivation in 
political life that would stabilize his well-ordered society.96  At the end of A 
Theory of Justice, he argued that a Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness 
could serve as the means of motivating citizens to support the two principles.  
A commitment to them would be based on a Kantian conception of the good 
life in which a person expresses her true nature as a free and equal being by 
exercising the capacity for justice.97  Justice was slated to serve as the final 
shared end of his well-ordered society and the collective activity of justice was 
to be the “preeminent form of human flourishing.”98  Rawls expected 
“congruence” between each citizen’s life plan and her respective sense of 
justice.99  The basic thought behind congruence is that it is rational to be 
reasonable for its own sake because justice is an intrinsic good.100  A sense of 
justice must be sufficiently strong to override temptations to free ride and the 
 
 93. Richard Arneson identifies three principal changes in Rawls’s writings after the 
publication of A Theory of Justice: “the Kantian conception of persons” (explaining that the 
parties in the original position are now identified as giving priority to their Kantian interest in the 
development and exercise of their moral powers of rational autonomy and fair dealing), “hedged 
bets on universalism” (explaining that the validity of Rawlsian principles is presented as relative 
to modern democratic societies), and “pluralism and the overlapping consensus imperative” 
(articulating shared moral convictions about what constitutes the fair treatment of citizens, 
providing a morally acceptable basis for political life despite conditions of moral pluralism).  
Richard J. Arneson, Introduction, 99 ETHICS 695, 696–97 (1989). 
 94. Lawrence B. Solum, Situating Political Liberalism, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 549, 555 
(1994). 
 95. By “comprehensive,” Rawls means systematic views, either secular or religious, which 
include “conceptions of what is of value in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and 
character, that are to inform much of our nonpolitical conduct . . . .  A doctrine is fully 
comprehensive when it covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely 
articulated scheme of thought . . . .”  RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 175. 
 96. Id. at 142–43. 
 97. RAWLS, supra note 65, at 572. 
 98. Id. at 526, 529. 
 99. Id. at 567.  For a more detailed account of the congruence problem, see Samuel Freeman, 
Congruence and the Good of Justice, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 277 (Samuel 
Freeman ed., 2003). 
 100. Freeman, supra note 51, at 346. 
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desire to act justly must not conflict with permissible life plans.101  Without 
congruence, real people would not be motivated to take up the impartial 
standpoint of justice and act appropriately toward their fellow citizens.  These 
remarks indicate that Rawls must have seen a Kantian interpretation of moral 
motivation as a precondition of the stability of his well-ordered society. 
At the outset of Political Liberalism, however, we learn that a conception 
of justice must be compatible with the fact of reasonable moral pluralism to be 
stable over time.102  Rawls now makes it clear that he had underestimated the 
extent to which any comprehensive doctrine or conception of the good could 
serve as the primary source of moral motives in a morally diverse society.  The 
most sensible interpretation of his shift to a political conception of justice is 
that he feared that citizens with different conceptions of the good would not be 
moved to support the two principles of justice for sufficiently moral reasons.  
His concern with the stability of his well-ordered society reflects his worry that 
real people who do not share the same conception of the good life would not be 
willing to endorse the same principles of justice, rendering them less 
motivationally adequate than he had previously supposed.103  His new account 
of how real citizens could share a political conception of justice that they are 
sufficiently motivated to honor requires a more historical account of liberal 
democratic citizenship.104  His attempt to ground this conception in something 
less controversial reflects his desire to convince citizens to be willing to let the 
balance of public reasons override their deeper religious or secular beliefs in 
cases of conflict.  The viability of his political conception of justice now 
depends upon his devising political arrangements that foster widespread 
allegiance to the two principles of justice without relying upon moral motives 
that derive from a shared conception of the good.105 
 
 101. RAWLS, supra note 65, at 497, 569. 
 102. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at xviii–xix. 
 103. The new Rawls does not reject the very concept of autonomy.  Rather, his political 
liberalism restricts its scope to the political realm—i.e., when a person thinks of himself or herself 
as a citizen—and thus, renders it less controversial than it otherwise would be.  That way, a 
liberal society would not impermissibly force nonliberal communities to bring up “rational 
choosers” in the name of the value of personal autonomy.  At the same time, political autonomy 
acknowledges the basic right of each person to form, revise, and pursue his or her conception of 
the good even when that conception is nonliberal.  See Will Kymlicka, Two Models of Pluralism 
and Tolerance, in TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE, supra note 15, at 81, 90. 
 104. For an argument that Rawls’s new conception of justice is not political because it 
oscillates between its metaphysical and political interpretations, see Patrick Neal, Justice as 
Fairness: Political or Metaphysical?, 18 POL. THEORY 24 (1990). 
 105. Of course, citizens may endorse Rawls’s principles of justice from their respective 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines.  However, the author does not think that Rawls is worried 
about people who are already fully reasonable.  Rather, the idea is that this kind of justification 
targets those who have somewhat reasonable yet nonliberal beliefs about the good life—i.e., those 
whose moral motivation to support his well-ordered society is not guaranteed. 
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Rawls’s divorcing his account of moral motivation as far as possible from 
any underlying comprehensive doctrine is driven by the difficulty of trying to 
close the motivational distance between the two moral powers (a capacity to 
form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good and a capacity for a sense of 
justice) with any kind of appeal to deeper comprehensive religious or moral 
doctrines.  As he came to realize, many citizens would not see the collective 
activity of justice as the highest form of human flourishing.  Because moral 
motives cannot be based directly on comprehensive beliefs in a morally 
pluralistic society, the effective desire to act justly must be removed, as far as 
possible, from all conceptions of the good. 
Part of his solution to this problem of moral motivation on the part of 
reasonable citizens under conditions of moral pluralism in Political Liberalism 
is still recognizably Kantian: A sense of justice is not in itself a recommended 
way of life but instead is a moral commitment that constrains the choice of 
individual ends in the first place.  Rawlsian liberalism is a theory of justice and 
political legitimacy.  It is not meant to articulate the nature of a good life or to 
be extended beyond the basic social, political, and economic institutions.106  
Unlike Kant, Rawls does not assert that universally binding moral principles 
must be grounded in pure practical reason independent of all contingent 
features of human nature.  In Rawls’s political scheme, nothing is implied 
about what makes an act morally praiseworthy.  As Kant might have said, this 
would confuse the doctrine of right with the doctrine of virtue.  Within the 
constraints of the right, citizens are free to pursue the ends that they see as 
worthwhile for their own reasons.  A sense of justice and its accompanying 
moral motivation, then, must be viewed without perfectionist biases.107  While 
a citizen who chooses to be a just person accepts the above constraints, that 
person need not base her life plan on the good of justice.  As it turns out in 
Political Liberalism, Rawls no longer thinks that the fit between the two moral 
powers has to be as tight as before.  The Kantian interpretation of moral 
motivation presented at the end of A Theory of Justice, which lays out the 
deeper moral reasons for the good of justice, is no longer appropriate because 
the source of moral motivation in political life cannot depend so heavily upon 
any controversial comprehensive doctrine. 
It is a very unsatisfactory response to the existence of moral pluralism to 
deny its existence, dismiss its relevance, or fail to appreciate how people who 
hold nonliberal beliefs understand themselves.108  Any serious attempt to 
 
 106. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 257–88. 
 107. This does not mean that consequences do not matter or that all considerations of value 
must be subordinated to principles of right.  See Barbara Herman, Leaving Deontology Behind, in 
THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT 208, 210 (1993). 
 108. The existence of moral pluralism about the good should not be confused with the 
question of whether all of those views are equally valid or rationally defensible.  From the point 
of view of moral motivation, the potential political problem is that real people are emotionally 
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justify liberal political morality to those who are not already converted must 
acknowledge the legitimate concern that a political morality that relies upon a 
distinctly liberal conception of the good may be unacceptable from a variety of 
potentially reasonable, yet nonliberal, moral or religious perspectives.  As 
Rawls came to realize, comprehensive liberal ideals are controversial and make 
it virtually impossible to establish legitimate grounds of coercion in a morally 
pluralistic society.  A liberal society should not predicate political authority, 
then, on the alleged superiority of a life based on Lockean freedom, Kantian 
autonomy, or Millian individuality.  To accept the burdens of judgment is to 
acknowledge the inherent limits of human reason and to recognize that other 
citizens adhere to beliefs that differ from our own yet still may be reasonable 
for political purposes.109 
III. CIVIC EDUCATION UNDER CONDITIONS OF MORAL PLURALISM 
A. Civic Education and Public Reason 
Just as no conception of political morality will please everyone, no 
conception of civic education will please everyone.  Nevertheless, this Article 
claims that a conception of citizenship premised on Rawlsian public reason is 
more likely than those of comprehensive liberalisms to be acceptable to the 
vast majority of reasonable persons.  Any conception of civic education, which 
would be appropriate for a morally pluralistic society such as our own, would 
have to strike a more appropriate balance between tolerance for different ways 
of life and cultivation of the skills and virtues that make good citizenship 
possible in a liberal democracy.  To agree that the practice of liberal 
democratic citizenship necessitates a distinct conception of civic competence 
leaves a lot of space for deliberation about the most appropriate means and the 
precise ends of liberal democratic civic education.  That does not mean that 
liberals should eschew teaching children the value of rationally assessing 
evidence on the grounds that all methods of acquiring truth are equally reliable.  
After all, even highly religious people want their choices to cohere with their 
preferences.  Invariably, as a byproduct of their civic education, children 
would learn that rational evaluation is more reliable than irrational alternatives 
for realizing their conceptions of the good. 
The principal problem is that liberals find themselves in an awkward, if not 
untenable, position.  On the one hand, they must respect or at least tolerate the 
different types of reasonable conceptions of the good that exist in their society.  
That conclusion seems to follow from liberal neutrality.  On the other hand, 
they are also committed to promoting an ideal of citizenship that enables 
 
wedded to their respective ways of life and will continue to hold their views even when they 
cannot withstand rigorous critique. 
 109. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 54–58. 
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people to respect the freedom and equality of their fellow citizens.  As a result, 
even among liberals themselves, the content of civic education is bound to be 
somewhat controversial.110  Unless one is convinced by Lockean arguments 
that the personal freedom of parents entails an absolute parental right to pass 
on their way of life to their children,111 the state must exercise some kind of 
educational authority over children in the interest of their future citizenship.  A 
society that seeks to create reasonable citizens cannot simply defer uncritically 
to the wishes of parents. 
It would seem to be obvious that, to function well, democracies must rely 
on the moral character of their citizens.  The right habits, attitudes, and 
principles—at least those that encourage toleration of dissent, respect for 
different ways of life, and critical thinking about authority—are easier to instill 
in children than in adults.  For the sake of civic education, governments are 
more justified in treating children paternalistically in the sense of restricting 
their freedom before their deliberative capacities have fully matured.  
Somewhat paradoxically, in some instances, children ought to be treated 
paternalistically to enable their rational capacities to develop.112  Although 
many institutions are educative, public schools must play a central role in the 
inculcation of reasonableness in children.113  Both Amy Gutmann and Stephen 
Macedo argue that civic education refers to the teaching of a specific 
curriculum that promotes liberal virtues.114  The purpose of civic education is 
to foster the skills and virtues that enable future citizens to propose fair terms 
of cooperation with others, to settle differences in mutually acceptable ways, to 
participate in collective decision making, and to abide by agreed terms of 
social cooperation provided that others reciprocate. 
1. Teaching Children to be Reasonable 
The above sort of civic education, like any other conception, is bound to be 
value-laden.115  As such, one cannot simply object to an educational proposal 
on the grounds that it teaches values as if any conception of civic education 
could be completely morally neutral.  Rather, one must put forth a substantive 
independent argument that makes the case for promoting some values at the 
expense of others.  Reasonableness is a complex psychological disposition that 
involves both intellectual and moral virtues that can be acquired over time.  
 
 110. Harry Brighouse, Civic Education and Liberal Legitimacy, 108 ETHICS 719, 719 (1998). 
 111. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85–107 (1962). 
 112. See Barbara Herman, Making Room for Character, in ARISTOTLE, KANT, AND THE 
STOICS: RETHINKING HAPPINESS AND DUTY 36 (Stephen Engstrom & Jennifer Whiting eds., 
1996). 
 113. The evidence is mixed on whether public schools today are effective in teaching 
autonomy.  See GUTMANN, supra note 16, at 62. 
 114. See, e.g., Gutmann, supra note 14; Macedo, supra note 24. 
 115. ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 26 (1987). 
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For Rawls, to be reasonable is to be committed to the criterion of reciprocity in 
collective decision making in the sense that the reasons offered in support of a 
particular political proposal are as fair as possible and likely to be acceptable to 
all reasonable people.  Under conditions of moral pluralism, one of the 
purposes of appealing to public reasons, as opposed to other sources of 
morality, is that such reasons are more likely to legitimate controversial 
decisions and thus, to encourage compliance.116  After all, political liberalism 
is resigned to accepting the inevitability of reasonable disagreement about the 
good in free societies.117  Similarly, it is also resigned to accepting the 
existence of hard cases that divide the political community.118  The task of 
rational justification is considerably more complicated than it would be in a 
more morally homogeneous society because what counts as a good argument, 
or even what counts as a good reason, may be reasonably contested.119  In the 
most controversial cases, no interpretation of public reason is likely to fit the 
facts perfectly.120  Even under the best of epistemic conditions, then, some of 
the most important decisions of public morality may be open to dispute 
because they have not been settled to the satisfaction of every reasonable 
member of the political community.121  This may mean that we may have to 
settle for “good enough” political legitimacy.122 
The comprehensive doctrine that one adheres to, of course, may entail a 
partial or full resolution of a fundamental political question.  For example, a 
hedonistic utilitarian may favor a right to privacy on the grounds that the 
balance of pain and pleasure supports such a right in most cases.  Or a Catholic 
 
 116. “Conditions of reasonable moral pluralism” refers to intractable disagreement over the 
nature of the good life for human beings.  As John Rawls puts it, “A modern democratic society is 
characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines.”  RAWLS, 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at xvi.  For an excellent overview of arguments 
concerning moral reasons to obey the law, see KENT GREENAWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND 
MORALITY 47–203 (1987). 
 117. See Larmore, supra note 17, at 61, 63, 74, 79. 
 118. Cf. MARY MIDGLEY, WICKEDNESS: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY 45 (1984) (noting that 
each new approach of evil brings new difficulties and problems). 
 119. Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, at xiv (1977) (recognizing that 
claims of right cannot always be demonstrated to be true or false). 
 120. Cf. Ken Kress, The Interpretive Turn, 97 ETHICS 834, 845 (1987) (discussing Dworkin’s 
views on the requirement of the fit); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 143 (1985) 
(noting that one justification is better than another if it is superior as a matter of political or moral 
theory). 
 121. Cf. CHARLES R. BEITZ, POLITICAL EQUALITY: AN ESSAY IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY 7–8 
(1989) (“There is no unequivocal conception of power—and so, no unambiguous principle of 
equal power—that can plausibly be taken as a basis for resolving dispute in all of these areas.”). 
 122. The author borrows this term from Seyla Benhabib, The Democratic Movement and the 
Problem of Difference, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF 
THE POLITICAL 8, 9 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996). 
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might support such a right for theistic or metaphysical reasons.  To be 
reasonable is to accept that some other reasons are at least reasonable enough, 
politically speaking, even if they may not be the best reasons according to 
one’s own conception of the good.  The point is that the reasonable citizen 
refrains from judging others’ conceptions of the good on the merits provided 
that these conceptions are reasonable for the limited purpose of making 
political legitimacy under conditions of moral pluralism possible.  The 
reasonable citizen may have to defer to the reasonable views of others that she 
would reject for her own moral or religious reasons if she were not acting as a 
citizen who has a special duty to provide them with reasons that they could 
accept.  As such, mutual tolerance on the basis of an acknowledgement of 
reasonable disagreement can serve as a moral motive for all reasonable 
citizens, even when most of them disagree about the highest matters of moral 
importance.  Moreover, this motive can be strengthened over time through its 
exercise.123 
At the same time, this dual identity may be difficult for some citizens.  As 
one critic has observed, such acceptance of moral and religious difference is 
incompatible with the current teachings of the Roman Catholic Church.124  In 
addition, certain kinds of fundamentalism, due to their dogmatism and literal 
reading of Scripture, are at odds with any requirement that counsels believers 
to eschew the whole truth in political argumentation.  In fact, more generally, 
highly religious people are likely to fear that their faith and that of their 
children is likely to be corrupted by the forces of a secular culture.  But those 
limiting cases do not mean that such a demand for reasonableness in political 
life could not be met by a wide variety of people who have been able to 
reconcile their faith with democratic ideals.125  Highly religious people may 
favor a more conspicuous role for religion in public life but that does not 
necessarily mean that they would prefer some sort of theocracy.  Future 
citizens must learn to think critically about their own deeper convictions, to 
appreciate the wide range of reasonable disagreement that characterizes their 
society, and to understand the difference between what is reasonable—i.e., 
what can be publicly justified to a morally diverse audience—and what may be 
right or true.  A shared recognition of the inherent limits of the capacity of 
human reason to evaluate different reasonable conceptions of the good on their 
merits makes it possible for such citizens to observe the criterion of reciprocity 
that lies at the center of public reason. 
 
 123. See Callan, supra note 14, at 28. 
 124. Leif Wenar, Political Liberalism: An Internal Critique, 106 ETHICS 32, 44–45 (1995). 
 125. For instance, many American Catholics do not accept official church teachings on 
divorce, abortion, and birth control. 
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2. Reasonableness 
As Samuel Freeman puts it, “Reasonableness involves a readiness to 
politically address others of different persuasions in terms of public 
reasons.”126  As such, reasonableness is the primary civic virtue of citizens 
who are committed to public reason.  Rawls specifies five attributes of 
reasonable persons: 
1. They (a) have the two moral powers (the capacities for a sense of justice 
and for a rationally defensible conception of the good); (b) possess the 
intellectual powers of judgment, thought, and inference; (c) have a 
determinate conception of the good based on some comprehensive 
view(s); and (d) can be normal, fully cooperating members of a well-
ordered society.127 
2. They are willing to propose and abide by fair principles of social 
cooperation provided that others will do likewise.128 
3. They recognize the burdens of judgment.129 
4. They have “a reasonable moral psychology.”130 
5. They recognize the “five essential elements of a conception of 
objectivity.”131 
These five features define a “reasonable” person.  The reasonable citizen must 
regard her fellow citizens as agents who have their own life plans and respect 
their right to make their own decisions about their own lives according to their 
own best judgments.  To act reasonably in political life is to regulate one’s 
conduct on the basis of the moral importance of these life plans from the 
standpoint of the person that adheres to them. 
Leif Wenar argues that even though most religions reject the burdens of 
judgment, “rejecting the burdens of judgment need not be incompatible with 
supporting liberal toleration.”132  He claims that many adherents of 
comprehensive doctrines, who do not accept the burdens of judgment as an 
explanation for the existence of reasonable moral pluralism, nonetheless 
enthusiastically support liberty of thought and freedom of conscience.133  He 
then concludes that acceptance of the burdens of judgment is unnecessary and 
 
 126. Samuel Freeman, Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment, 29 PHIL. & PUB. 
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 128. Id. at 48–54, 81. 
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counterproductive insofar as religious people who have alternative (religious) 
grounds for toleration cannot be reasonable under Rawls’s overly restrictive 
definition of the term.134  Obviously, if citizens could be reasonable without 
meeting all of the above conditions, then Rawlsian citizenship would be easier 
to realize in practice.  The point is that Rawls is not trying to reach citizens 
who are already fully reasonable or those who are unreasonable and unwilling 
to change their views.  There is no reason to preach to the converted or to make 
extraordinary efforts to reach the unreachable.  His concern is about the 
allegiance of those who are on the border of being unreasonable given their 
nonliberal beliefs about the good.  Because of their numbers, their allegiance is 
vital if the well-ordered society is going to be stable for the right reasons. 
Doctrinally, Wenar may be right.  Catholics and other religious believers 
should not be asked to sacrifice the fundamental tenets of their faith to be good 
citizens.  On the other hand, it is not surprising that people who have 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines turn out to be reasonable irrespective of 
their particular religious convictions.  This mind-set is more a matter of having 
a reasonable moral psychology than of adhering to a reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine.  Indeed, that people have a reasonable disposition may predispose 
them toward embracing a reasonable conception of the good, that is, a 
conception that respects the freedom and equality of others.  Fortunately, the 
vast majority of citizens do not have comprehensive doctrines that are entirely 
coherent.  Those who are not fanatics are likely to have a large number of 
different moral commitments that cannot be reduced to a single comprehensive 
doctrine.  In addition, they are likely to have a basic impulse to treat others 
fairly provided that they are treated fairly in return.  Nor are their 
interpretations of their respective comprehensive doctrines always likely to 
converge, especially in hard cases.  In hard cases, the application of a legal rule 
is bound to turn, to some degree, on the interpretation of the principles and 
policies that are not explicitly contained in the rule itself.135  As an example, 
constitutional interpretation often requires the judge to bridge the gap between 
highly abstract constitutional language and the actual particulars of the case.136 
 
 134. Id. at 43. 
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This partially explains why two people of the same religious faith may find 
themselves at opposite ends of the political spectrum.  They may adhere to the 
same or similar values but disagree on the political implications of these 
values.  Or conceptually, they may simply have different understandings of the 
higher-level principles themselves.  For these reasons, it would be more fruitful 
to think of the consensus on political morality that Rawls hopes for as a 
consensus of citizens based on common-sense understandings of fairness and 
reciprocity.  After all, people, not doctrines, must act.137  Moreover, it is not as 
if liberals invented the ideas of reasonableness, reciprocity, and social 
justice.138  The best way to answer concerns about the apparent motivational 
limitations of real human beings is to focus on the moral psychology of the 
citizens who are capable of acting from a wide range of moral reasons, many 
of which may have mundane origins. 
3. Accommodating Nonliberal Conceptions of the Good 
The most serious difficulty with a liberal democratic civic education is that 
values taught exclusively for the purpose of good citizenship are bound to spill 
over into the private sphere.139  A child who is taught to reflect critically in her 
role as citizen is also highly likely to reflect critically on her life choices in her 
role as a private individual.  A civic education that produces future citizens 
who respect the freedom and equality of their fellow citizens also should inflict 
minimal damage on reasonable pluralism.  Even when there is no possibility of 
non-neutral effects,140 a liberal society should aspire to as much neutrality as 
possible.  An important part of this last task involves addressing the problem of 
“foreign policy”141 in the sense of dealing with those who hold reasonable but 
nonliberal conceptions of the good and addressing their concerns with good-
faith efforts.  While we cannot expect the tension between personal morality 
and the obligations of liberal democratic citizenship to disappear anytime soon, 
a conception of civic education that is morally acceptable under conditions of 
moral pluralism must try to balance these two equally important 
considerations. 
The next question, then, is why would any citizen, especially a person 
whose conception of the good conflicts to some degree with her civic duties, 
accept public reason as a political morality, thereby subordinating her deeper 
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religious or philosophical views to its norms when acting in the role of citizen?  
What kinds of reasons could a political liberal give to a person who is 
potentially reasonable but who has a nonliberal way of life to convince her of 
the primacy of the civic virtue of reasonableness?  Surely, such a person is 
more likely to feel “motivational strain” under a political scheme based upon 
public reason than a citizen who has a more liberal conception of the good.142  
The first answer is that the desire to honor public reason is hardly a full-time 
commitment.143  As Bruce Ackerman writes, liberal citizenship should be a 
“loose-fitting garment that many can wear without grave discomfort as they 
enter the public forum.”144  That is one of its primary strengths.  The second 
answer is that all persons, as rational agents, will want the freedom to pursue 
their conceptions of the good free from unreasonable interference by the state 
or by others.  This means that they ought to support individual rights that make 
such a pursuit possible even when their conceptions of the good turn out to be 
more communitarian and less individualistic.  The modest demands of public 
reason turn out to be advantageous in that they can motivate citizens to live up 
to their civic responsibilities while retaining their nonliberal conceptions of the 
good.  In theory, this is all the moral motivation that is necessary to secure 
political stability for the right reasons.  The desire to be a good citizen in a 
liberal democracy governed by public reason, of course, can be a central 
component of this person’s conception of the good life.  In fact, we should 
expect, or at least hope, that many citizens in the well-ordered society will 
aspire to treating their fellow citizens fairly.  Nothing rules out the possibility 
of having more support for public reason from underlying reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. 
The challenge lies in determining to what degree a commitment to public 
reason has to be congruent with different comprehensive doctrines to be 
motivationally effective.  How much tension between public reason and a 
particular conception of the good is too much tension?  There is no reason to 
assume that a basic commitment to reasonableness has to be grounded in deep 
philosophical or religious stories about the good life when ordinary citizens 
can act from a variety of moral reasons that have many different possible 
sources.  This does not mean that any reason counts as a good reason when 
citizens apply norms of public reason to real cases.  The point is not to defer 
uncritically to whatever reasons nonliberal citizens happen to have.  The 
capacity to be reasonable must be detached from deeper beliefs, as far as 
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possible, to secure fair terms of social cooperation under condition of moral 
pluralism.  The best hope for political legitimacy involves trying to determine 
whether the kinds of moral reasons that motivate citizens with moral 
differences can be equally strong or, more basically, strong enough even when 
they are not directly derived from deeper conceptions of the good.  This 
distinction must be drawn if public reason is to have any chance of being 
endorsed from the wide range of existing reasonable religious and moral 
perspectives that exist in a morally pluralistic society. 
There is nothing particularly mysterious about the kind of moral 
motivation that emerges from a commitment to being reasonable in political 
life.  People often obey the law because they believe that it is proper to do so 
and largely base their evaluations of political and judicial institutions on the 
degree to which they have been treated with respect.145  According to studies 
of procedural justice, citizens react favorably to whether police officers and 
judges make their decisions fairly.146  People may also believe that a particular 
decision is wrong yet continue to support it when they respect the impartiality 
and competence of the institution.147  Similarly, “tenants, consumers, and 
welfare recipients often regard the way in which they are treated by 
governmental institutions at least as importantly as the extent to which they 
achieve their substantive goals.”148  Other empirical studies on jury trials 
indicate that people tend to judge their experience from a procedural standpoint 
independent of the actual outcome.149  These studies suggest that the desire to 
treat others fairly need not be based on a conception of the good or on a deeper 
moral reality because people can and do act for reasons that have everyday 
origins.150 
B. Objections 
A number of critics of liberal civic education doubt that it can be neutral in 
the sense of preserving nonliberal beliefs in the background culture.  For 
instance, Shelley Burtt argues that liberals must go to great lengths to 
accommodate parents with religious objections to the public-school 
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curriculum.151  As she points out, highly religious parents have two primary 
concerns: (1) They seek to protect their children from an “aggressively 
materialistic culture” and (2) They want their children to be able to resist the 
temptation to sin.152  If she is right, then religious parents are not opposed to 
the teaching of reasonableness per se as long as reasonableness does not 
dispose their children to value worldly goods or to engage in immoral 
behavior. 
That is good news.  For the sake of argument, however, let us assume that 
this claim about what deeply religious parents want is suspect.  In Mozert v. 
Hawkins Board of Education,153 Christian Fundamentalist parents challenged 
the requirement of the local school board that their children read from 
textbooks that exposed them to a number of different ways of life, as opposed 
to pressuring them into affirming particular secular beliefs.154  This legal claim, 
based on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, was unique in that 
the plaintiffs claimed that they had a constitutional right to protect their 
children from mere exposure to different ideas.155  In effect, they asked the 
court to tolerate their particular religious beliefs by eliminating examples of 
tolerance from the school curriculum for their children alone.  The parents’ 
claim was predicated on the belief that mere exposure to ideas violated their 
free exercise of religion and their rights to control the upbringing of their 
children.156  This exposure was not the equivalent of forcing a Jehovah’s 
Witness school child to salute the American flag during the pledge of 
allegiance157 because the children in Mozert were not being compelled to 
perform an act that violated their conscience.158  As such, Mozert did not neatly 
fit into extant Free Exercise Clause case law.  Mere exposure to particular 
ideas, like mere exposure to children and teachers who may not share their 
religious beliefs, seems to be a far cry from the kind of unjustified coercion 
that the religion clauses of the First Amendment were designed to address.159 
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C. Rebuttal 
The goal of civic education in public reason is to specify a civic minimum 
that is as tolerant as possible of nonliberal ways of life without compromising 
the behavioral predispositions and the deliberative, casuistic skills that make 
good citizenship possible in modern liberal democracies.160  Civic minimalists 
contend that parental authority over public schools may only be limited by 
what is essential to future liberal democratic citizenship.161  The real issue, 
then, is to define these essentials and to determine their actual implications.  
The desire of parents to pass on their way of life to their children must be 
limited by the fact that their children are future citizens.  Children must learn to 
treat their fellow citizens as political equals who have a right to form, revise, 
and pursue their respective conceptions of the good.  That is non-negotiable.  
Agreeing to disagree about reasonable conceptions of the good is a step toward 
this legitimate end.  Just as parents may not impede the normal physical, 
emotional, and intellectual development of their children, parents do not have 
the right to impede the acquisition of civic competence in public reason. 
D. A Weaker Conception of Autonomy 
In short, parental rights end where the capacity for political autonomy 
begins.  Here, it is important to recognize that there is a crucial difference 
between personal autonomy as constitutive of the good life as opposed to the 
kind of political autonomy that underlies reasonableness as a civic attitude.162  
Indeed, the existence of a significant gap between political autonomy and 
deeper, personal autonomy is basic to political liberalism.163  The very 
plausibility of a more political kind of liberalism would seem to turn on the 
extent to which a citizen with a non-liberal conception of the good—i.e., one 
who did not make room for the value of critical reflection—nevertheless could 
be reasonable for limited political purposes. 
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To complicate matters, the exact meaning of autonomy is contested.164  
Robert Nozick’s definition of personal autonomy is nearly synonymous with 
that of an examined life: 
  The understanding gained in examining a life itself comes to permeate that 
life and direct its course.  To live an examined life is to make a self-portrait.  
Staring out at us from his later self-portraits, Rembrandt is not simply someone 
who looks like that but one who also sees and knows himself as that, with the 
courage this requires.  We see him knowing himself.  And he unflinchingly 
looks out at us too who are seeing him look so unflinchingly at himself, and 
that look of his not only shows himself to us so knowing, it patiently waits for 
us too to become with equal honesty knowing of ourselves. 
  . . . . 
  The activities of a life are infused by examination, not just affected by it, 
and their character is different when permeated by the results of concentrated 
reflection. 
  . . . . 
  I do not say with Socrates that the unexamined life is not worth living—
that is unnecessarily harsh.  However, when we guide our lives by our own 
pondered thoughts, it then is our life that we are living, not someone else’s.  In 
this sense, the unexamined life is not lived as fully.165 
Gerald Dworkin describes personal autonomy as “a second-order capacity of 
persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, desires, wishes, 
and so forth and the capacity to accept or attempt to change these in light of 
higher-order preferences and values.”166  Thomas Hill adds, “[an autonomous] 
person ideally [is not] moved by blind adherence to tradition or authority, by 
outside threats or bribes, by unreflective impulse, or unquestioned habits of 
thought.”167  For Thomas Hurka, “To be autonomous . . . is to direct oneself 
where different directions are possible.”168 
Naturally, many liberals would prefer a society in which most citizens 
were disposed to critical reflection, to disavow superstitions, to make their own 
choices, and to accept responsibility for the consequences of their personal 
decisions.  For most of them, though, that preference is not the equivalent of 
supporting a state that is designed to foster a radical sense of autonomy or even 
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a strong sense of personal autonomy in its citizens.169  As Brian Barry notes, 
“In a liberal society, people who do not wish to devote themselves to Socratic 
questioning are perfectly free not to do so.”170  The equal freedom for each 
citizen that political liberalism promotes, which is independent of the content 
of each person’s reasonable conception of the good, means that citizens can 
have whatever beliefs they please and also the freedom to associate with 
whomever they please.  Those beliefs only must be reasonable in the sense of 
respecting the freedom and equality of their fellow citizens when collective 
decisions are to be made. 
Nor does autonomy have to be over-intellectualized.171  A person can be 
autonomous in the weaker sense even when she has not given deep thought to 
a particular decision or to her way of life.  After all, most, if not all, of us are 
fundamentalists in that we harbor at least some unreflective commitments.172  
Autonomy admits of degrees inasmuch as human lives are more or less 
autonomous depending upon the amount of critical reflection that typically 
goes into the individual decision-making process over an extended period.173  
Surely, a minimally autonomous life need not consist in only deeply 
autonomous decisions.  This also does not mean that an over-examined life is 
necessarily better than a life that is the product of less critical reflection.  A 
weaker conception of autonomy—i.e., one that does not define autonomy in 
Socratic terms—is the best means of answering the concern that Rawls’s 
political conception of the person has smuggled in an ethically controversial 
conception of personal autonomy.174  In addition, a number of commentators 
have insisted that liberalism does not require the teaching of autonomy.175  For 
these reasons, autonomy need not be a way of life. 
Others have claimed that the very notion of a purely “political” liberalism 
is incoherent.  Eamonn Callan insists that the distinction that Rawls draws 
between his political liberalism and comprehensive liberalism is illusory.176  
That “political” liberalism requires a deeper conception of autonomy 
compromises its political nature and thus, causes it to collapse into a 
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comprehensive liberalism.177  To avoid the charge that political autonomy is 
disguised personal or ethical autonomy, actions must speak louder than words.  
That is, political liberals must tolerate life plans that do not value autonomy, 
critical reflection, or individual expression.  That there is bound to be extensive 
overlap between the skills of democratic citizenship and autonomy and 
individuality as conceptions of the good should mean that the state must have 
very strong reasons to compel people to act on beliefs that they do not hold. 
There are limits, of course, to liberal neutrality.  Obviously, liberal theories 
do not demand wholesale toleration of the intolerant.178  Indeed, excluding 
libertarians, no liberal would maintain that the state could not enact anti-
discrimination laws.  The liberal refusal to use the power of the state to impose 
a more liberal conception of the good should not be construed as tacit moral 
approval of these ways of life or as revealing skepticism about the possibility 
of making such evaluations rationally.179  The best explanation for the liberal 
attitude toward nonliberal beliefs lies in the strong reluctance on the part of 
liberals to use legislation to accomplish what they cannot bring about through a 
rational exchange of ideas.  For a liberal, it is terribly wrong to impose an idea 
upon another human being even when that person is living a life that leaves a 
lot to be desired by liberal standards of human flourishing.  It is a tragedy 
when coercion is the only option.  After all, there would be something deeply 
unsettling about a political philosophy that above all valued the importance of 
people making their lives their own and at the same time had no qualms about 
using the coercive power of the state to force people to do what is purportedly 
in their best interests. 
Surely, the civic capacities involved in the practice of public reason help us 
to live autonomously.  As Amy Gutmann puts it, “The skills of political 
reflection cannot be neatly differentiated from the skills of evaluating one’s 
own way of life.”180  We can be taught methods for evaluating the truth or 
falsehood of various claims about the world and learn about the reliability of 
statistical evidence.  We can avoid being manipulated by developing the ability 
to investigate truth claims about the world on our own.  The acquisition of 
deliberative, casuistic skills is bound to provide children with more 
opportunities to be autonomous than they would have had otherwise in the 
absence of a civic education that put all educational authority in the hands of 
their parents.  This does not necessarily mean, though, that they will reject the 
faith or way of life of their parents.  Commitments initially generated by non-
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autonomous mechanisms become autonomous when the agent reflects upon 
them with some degree of critical attention or accepts them “from the 
inside.”181  A person can always subject the beliefs that were formed in her 
childhood to critical scrutiny by comparing them with other possibilities, even 
possibilities limited to particular interpretations of particular religious, moral, 
or cultural traditions.  If these beliefs survive, then they are now held 
autonomously.182 
There are two obvious objections to this weaker conception of autonomy: 
(1) it unfairly demotes unchosen commitments; (2) it is unlikely to satisfy 
those who maintain that a more perfectionist kind of autonomy lies at the core 
of the human good.  This first objection is not decisive because it trades on an 
ambiguity in the meaning of “unchosen.”  Without question, we do not choose 
our natural assets and we often find ourselves in circumstances that limit the 
range of viable options available to us.  We are not radically free in the sense 
of being able to recreate ourselves anew as existentialists might have us to 
believe.  At the same time, in a minimal sense, our conscious decisions are a 
product of some degree of choice even when we make these decisions for bad 
reasons.  As an example, a person who is pressured by her family and friends 
to marry within her racial or ethnic group and does so has made a choice, even 
if she would have made a different decision under different conditions. 
From the standpoint of political liberalism, whether a person lives well 
does not turn on whether she has deeply reflected upon her most important 
commitments in a Socratic manner.  Political liberalism is agnostic on these 
types of deeply personal, politically irrelevant questions.  These choices are her 
own even when they are based on reasons that we do not understand or do not 
find to be persuasive.  Without a doubt, rational reflection is an important 
good; it can help us to detect inconsistencies in our thinking and to determine 
whether we have adopted the most appropriate means to our ends.  As such, 
minimal rational scrutiny is indispensable to living well as a human being.  At 
the same time, that does not mean that citizens must reflect very thoroughly on 
their deepest beliefs and commitments to live well.  If that were the standard, 
very few of us would ever approximate any kind of autonomous life. 
When we separate autonomy as constitutive of a good human life from the 
sort of minimal political autonomy that would enable reasonable citizens to 
apply norms of public reason in political life, we can see that most people are 
more or less autonomous or at least have the potential to be so.183  That is all 
 
 181. On the idea of living a life “from the inside,” see WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, 
COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 12 (1989); KYMLICKA, supra note 10, at 80–84. 
 182. Cf. Sher, supra note 162, at 151. 
 183. For an argument that Catholics should endorse a Rawlsian political conception of justice, 
see Leslie Griffin, Good Catholics Should Be Rawlsian Liberals, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 297 
(1997). 
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that we need, politically speaking, and is consistent with the assumption of 
political liberalism that a shared social understanding of the good will never 
come about on its own.184  In this respect, political liberalism is more 
hospitable to moral pluralism than comprehensive liberalism is.185 
E. Mitigating the Effects of a Civic Education in Public Reason 
Therefore, the right kind of civic education is central to ensuring that 
citizens will be able to meet the demands of public reason in political life.186  
Indeed, the state must actively educate children to ensure that they acquire the 
basic civic skills that will help them to become politically literate and 
responsible.187  Ultimately, the aim of any liberal democratic model of civic 
education should be to strike a fair balance between the parental interest of 
passing on cultural or religious beliefs to children and the interest of a liberal 
democratic state in ensuring that its future citizens reach a minimal level of 
civic competence.188  As we have seen, political liberals must advance a 
particular vision of citizenship while trying to remain as agnostic as possible 
toward reasonable comprehensive beliefs in the background culture.  At 
minimum, that is what liberal neutrality requires.  At the same time, they ought 
to be equally committed to corrective measures to offset the effects of civic 
education in public reason on the private identities of nonliberal children, 
thereby reducing the burden on parents who have nonliberal conceptions of the 
good.189 
There are three primary ways of accomplishing this objective.  First, 
different methods of pedagogy may lessen the impact of liberal civic education 
on nonliberal beliefs and reduce the necessity of forcing the children of 
 
 184. It is not clear in Rawls’s account in POLITICAL LIBERALISM whether this is an 
epistemological or empirical thesis about how much convergence we can expect under current 
social and political conditions.  Rawls also comments that the general idea of political liberalism, 
which is relatively new, can also be found in the work of contemporary liberal thinkers like 
Charles Larmore, Judith Shklar, Bruce Ackerman, and Joshua Cohen.  RAWLS, POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 214 n.3, 231 n.12, 233 n.17, 238 n.25, 239 n.27. 
 185. See TOMASI, supra note 163, at 127. 
 186. On the relationship between civic education and liberal legitimacy, see Brighouse, supra 
note 110. 
 187. GUTMANN, supra note 16. 
 188. This Article takes for granted the assumption that there is no value-free or perfect 
political answer that would satisfy everyone.  As such, the real question is what values are being 
taught.  In addition, the most reasonable solution to the problem of civic education will involve a 
trade-off of values or interests that is acceptable to as many reasonable persons as possible. 
 189. But see Stephen V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper, Conclusion: The Implications of 
Equal Treatment, in EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 200, 205 
(Stephen V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper eds., 1998) (discussing the potentially prohibitive 
costs of legal exemptions for more than two thousand identifiable religious worldviews). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
360 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 49:319 
religious fundamentalists, for example, to read objectionable texts.190  Second, 
children who have nonliberal conceptions of the good should be allowed to 
explain their deeper beliefs to their classmates.  Third, as Macedo puts forth, a 
second stage of public justification that would consider requests for 
accommodation and exemptions on a case-by-case basis would ease the fear of 
those who believe that the very existence of a liberal polity threatens their way 
of life.191  A more balanced approach to civic education would enable 
nonliberal citizens to “negotiate the interface of their public and nonpublic 
identities as they go about building their social worlds.”192  This is not as broad 
as Galston’s principle of maximum feasible accommodation of diversity but it 
leaves sufficient room for reasonable attempts to ensure that the minimal 
requirements of civic education are met.193 
The next question, then, is whether we can cultivate a commitment to 
public reason without undercutting the equally important commitment to 
accommodating reasonable moral pluralism about conceptions of the good.194  
After all, significant differences between secularists and traditional religionists 
still exist.195  To accommodate or not to accommodate is not the only 
question.196  In addition, we must figure out how we can avoid deferring to 
parental judgment on every single question while permitting parents to retain 
some educational authority over their children.  Liberals do not have to fall 
into the trap of either accommodating all sorts of religious or cultural beliefs or 
becoming moral authoritarians.  After all, the case against unrestricted parental 
deference is fairly straightforward: (1) Parents do not own their children as if 
they were personal property but rather are entrusted with the fiduciary 
responsibility of guiding their moral development and ensuring that they 
acquire the minimal skills that would enable them to function as normal adults; 
 
 190. For a detailed account of the “pedagogical” approach, see Coleman, supra note 172. 
 191. Macedo, supra note 24, at 483–84. 
 192. TOMASI, supra note 163, at 125. 
 193. When members of a political community exercise coercive power over one another, it 
matters whether they respect the freedom and equality of others and can act reasonably toward 
them.  Like the Amish, those who do not want to be full members of the liberal state should not 
be forced to accept its benefits and burdens.  Those who are not members of the political 
community are free to reject liberal-democratic values.  On the idea of partial citizenship, see 
JEFF SPINNER, THE BOUNDARIES OF CITIZENSHIP: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND NATIONALITY IN THE 
LIBERAL STATE 95–99 (1994). 
 194. This may not necessarily mean erecting a higher or less porous barrier between church 
and state.  See Charles L. Glenn, What Would Equal Treatment Mean for Public Education?, in 
EQUAL TREATMENT OF RELIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY, supra note 189, at 75, 75–100. 
 195. See JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 
45–46 (1991). 
 196. Cf. TED G. JELEN & CLYDE WILCOX, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD CHURCH AND STATE 
57–97 (1995) (arguing that although Americans usually support strict separation of church and 
state in theory, they often accept state accommodation of religion in particular cases as well). 
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(2) children are also future citizens who must learn to cooperate with others; 
(3) to be able to cooperate with others is to be able to resolve conflicts with 
them fairly; (4) therefore, not all parental choices are morally acceptable 
because some of these choices do not equip children for the role of citizen that 
they are expected to play later in life.197 
These kinds of corrective measures will not satisfy everyone, but they 
should give us some rough ideas about how we might answer the charge that 
political liberals do indirectly what comprehensive liberals do openly—
transform nonliberal conceptions of the good into conceptions that are 
considerably liberalized.198  As this Article has tried to show, the practical 
implications of such an education in public reason need not lead to wholesale 
assimilation.  Reasonable people with nonliberal conceptions of the good have 
less reason to feel threatened even though such a civic education may make it 
more difficult for some parents to pass on their way of life to their children.  
The point of developing a distinctly political conception of liberalism in the 
first place was to avoid the political implications of justifying liberal political 
morality on an overly controversial conception of moral personality that could 
not win the free assent of nearly all reasonable citizens for the right reasons. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Although Marxist criticisms of liberal theory and practice no longer have 
the appeal that they once had, liberalism is still attacked on two main fronts.199  
While neorepublicans have alleged that liberal values are too thin to hold a 
society together over time and to motivate citizens to act appropriately, 
postmodernists have taken liberalism to task for being unable to accommodate 
morally important differences.200  Taken together, these standpoints suggest 
that liberalism either is morally impoverished or morally oppressive.201  
Neither predicate, of course, is terribly attractive.  This Article has argued that 
 
 197. Cf. STEPHEN V. MONSMA & J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM: 
CHURCH AND STATE IN FIVE DEMOCRACIES 23 (1997) (explaining how, historically, the common 
school was supposed to function as a force of national unity and inculcate habits of good 
citizenship). 
 198. TOMASI, supra note 163, at 8–9. 
 199. On the Marxist critique of liberal justice, see Allen W. Wood, The Marxian Critique of 
Justice, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 244 (1972). 
 200. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 118 (1990) 
(arguing that “desire for political unity will suppress difference, and tend to exclude some voices 
and perspectives from the public”).  Nietzsche offers an alternative ethic that aspires to be more 
generous, more creative, and more responsive to human impulses, yearnings, and resentments.  
BONNIE HONIG, POLITICAL THEORY AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF POLITICS 8 (1993). 
 201. In addition, some feminists have criticized liberalism on the grounds that abstract 
individual rights and abstract principles of equality mask men’s sexual domination of women.  
See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 
14–15 (1987). 
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political liberalism strikes an appropriate balance between the equal rights of 
citizens to practice nonliberal ways of life and the need of the state to produce 
citizens who are willing to respect the freedom and equality of their fellow 
citizens.202  Liberals must resist the temptation to promote their particular 
conception of the good in justifying public reason as a regulatory political 
morality to others who are potentially reasonable but have nonliberal 
conceptions of the good.203 
For many liberals, that may be a bitter pill to swallow.  That is perhaps 
why so many of them managed to ignore what Rawls had written after A 
Theory of Justice.204  To claim that politics should not be about the good life, 
though, is not to claim that such questions about human flourishing are 
unimportant.  Indeed, such questions are so important to so many people.  The 
whole point of trying to prevent religious and moral comprehensive beliefs 
from becoming the moral basis of public law is that such beliefs are bound to 
be controversial and therefore, subject to reasonable disagreement.  At the 
same time, the process of reason giving is central to the public justification of 
the exercise of political power.205  Public reason captures the idea that the 
members of a morally pluralistic society such as our own must rely upon 
reasons that will be acceptable to all reasonable persons so that principles of 
political morality and the collective decisions that fall under them may be 
publicly justified.206  The practice of public reason raises difficult questions 
about how we might go about promoting mass deliberation in the sense of 
 
 202. Although Rawls’s ideal of the citizen is often taken to be liberal, his conception of 
citizenship is also premised on the importance of ensuring that all citizens participate equally in 
the process of making mutually binding collective decisions.  Amy Gutmann, Rawls on the 
Relationship between Liberalism and Democracy, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS, 
supra note 99, at 168, 196.  As such, it is clear that he is defending a democratic liberalism.  See 
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 203. Cf. Thomas Nagel, Moral Conflict and Political Legitimacy, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 215 
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 204. As Burton Dreben has observed, Rawls’s second book, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, 
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CONSTITUTION 24 (1993) (stating that “the principle of impartiality requires government to 
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encouraging all citizens to think seriously about constitutional essentials and 
matters of basic justice.207  It also raises questions about how strong the ideal 
of public reason should be and who might be excluded if everyone were asked 
to follow its norms.208 
Without question, a civic education in public reason can break down 
identities and make it more difficult for distinct religious and cultural identities 
to thrive or even survive.209  Put differently, “spillover effects” are 
unavoidable.210  It stands to reason, then, that it is disingenuous for 
comprehensive and political liberals alike to pretend that a civic education in 
public reason would not somehow affect the moral orientations of children 
who are taught to practice public reason.  After all, that is its purpose inasmuch 
as children are future citizens.  Because our history is full of examples of 
forced assimilation, moreover, most of us naturally tend to be wary of political 
efforts to assimilate religious and cultural minorities in the name of greater 
social unity.211 
Yet parental educational authority should be limited by the fact that a child 
is a future citizen whose votes will affect other people who deserve equal 
concern and respect.212  While teaching children to think critically about their 
own lives cannot be neatly separated from teaching them to think for 
themselves about politics, the relative absence of coercion and sincere efforts 
at accommodation are likely to permit religious and cultural identities to 
change on their own over time or resist the forces of change as much as 
possible in the modern world.  This Article has tried to explain why a 
conceptual distinction between comprehensive and political liberalism is 
politically necessary, even if theoretically, the distinction is very fine.  This 
Article has also tried to explain how a liberal democracy might inculcate a 
commitment to public reason in its future citizens while accommodating 
reasonable yet nonliberal conceptions of the good.  There will be hard cases at 
the margins and reasonable people will balance competing considerations 
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differently and may reach different conclusions.213  That is a fact that we are 
going to have to live with, but it need not lead us to the radically skeptical 
conclusion that public justification of law is impossible under conditions of 
moral pluralism.  Whether it is impossible will largely turn on the extent to 
which ordinary citizens are sincerely motivated to provide their fellow citizens 
with widely shared reasons.  That this task of public reasoning is bound to 
demand a lot, both cognitively and morally, of ordinary citizens should not 
detract from its promise of political legitimacy. 
In cases where nonliberal religious or cultural values conflict with the 
fundamental aim of civic education of producing citizens who will respect the 
freedom and equality of their fellow citizens, liberals can and must take their 
own side in an argument.  That means that liberals must resist the lure of more 
 
 213. The range of application of a norm is likely to be underdetermined at times.  People who 
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communication implies some basis of common judgment.  There must be some agreement on 
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extreme forms of multiculturalism.214  In addition, they must also eschew 
moral nihilism.215  On the other hand, the difficulty with a maximalist liberal 
civic education that teaches autonomy as the highest good is that it is 
insufficiently tolerant of reasonable moral pluralism and may drive those with 
nonliberal conceptions of the good underground or cause parents to remove 
their children from public schools.  This is another way of saying that liberals 
cannot be too attached to the purity of the concept at the cost of its likely 
political implications.  The act of putting a robust conception of autonomy at 
the center of the curriculum in public schools is bound to alienate those who 
value other goods above the ability to reflect deeply on life choices.  This does 
not mean, though, that the state always has to defer to the wishes of parents 
who seek to prevent their children from being exposed to different ways of life.  
A civic education that is too minimal, albeit less controversial, is unlikely to 
create citizens who are capable of meeting the demands of public reason in 
political life. 
Lockean arguments for non-interference make sense in that coercion may 
not be an effective means of changing people’s beliefs and, indeed, may be 
counterproductive in the long run.  At the same time, non-interference puts too 
much educational authority into the hands of parents who seek to pass their 
nonliberal ways of life to their children, thereby compromising the ability of 
their children to acquire the skills, virtues, and attitudes that would enable 
them to act reasonably toward others later in life.  After all, reasonableness 
imposes heavy intellectual and emotional demands on citizens, and it takes 
time for children to learn how to develop the diverse set of deliberative skills 
and civic attitudes that would enable them to put norms of public reason into 
practice.216  The tension between personal morality and liberal democratic 
citizenship is not going to disappear anytime soon and is more of a 
psychological burden for some people than for others.217  To be a liberal is to 
be able to live comfortably with this tension and to respect the life choices of 
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others even when those choices appear to be foolish or morally suspect.  To be 
reasonable, furthermore, is to live a double life as an individual with deep 
personal convictions and as a citizen who has a civic duty to tolerate the life 
plans of others who share her social space.  For most of us, this double life 
does not lead to an identity crisis.218  That should give us hope. 
 
 
 218. Cf. David Heyd, Introduction, in TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE, supra note 15, at 3, 
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